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THE IRRATIONAL WOMAN: INFORMED CONSENT AND ABORTION
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It must be admitted that women have but little sense of justice . . . . We say
also of women that their social interests are weaker than those of men, and that
their capacity for the sublimation of their instincts is less.1
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the
mother has for her child . . . . While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret
their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the law’s failure to treat pregnant women as capable of
making their own decisions concerning whether to have an abortion. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzales v. Carhart,3 which upheld a federal ban on
a type of second-trimester abortion that many physicians believe is safer for
their patients, brought the question of women’s capacity for healthcare decisionmaking to the forefront of public legal consciousness. In Carhart, the Court
abandoned its previous deference and respect for a woman’s right to be her own
decision-maker with regard to abortion and instead determined that a pregnant
woman lacks capacity to make her own decisions and to give informed consent
to abortion-related medical treatment. According to the Court, the government
may make the final decision regarding a pregnant woman’s healthcare to ensure
that she realizes her “ultimate” role as a mother.
Carhart marks the Supreme Court’s first refusal to require a health
exception to an abortion restriction since Roe v. Wade and its first use of the antiabortion movement’s woman-protective rationale to uphold an abortion ban.4
The woman-protective rationale claims that banning abortion promotes
women’s mental health.5 Carhart’s woman-protective anti-abortion reasoning
casts the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban as a public health measure that
serves to protect women from “regret” and depression. Contrary to this claim,
the Carhart decision not only endangers women’s health, but also may
encourage courts and legislatures to approve other similar measures under the
guise of “protecting” women. The woman-protective rationale also obscures the
underlying constitutional question at issue in challenges to “partial-birth”
abortion bans—may the government jeopardize women’s health for the sake of
the government’s “ethical and moral” interests in the fetus?6

3. Id.
4. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of “Woman-Protective”
Abortion Restrictions, U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 991–94 (2007) (describing development of the claim that
women regret their abortions and labeling this claim the “woman-protective” anti-abortion
argument) [hereinafter Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion].
6. See Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007). See also Rebecca Dresser, Protecting Women from their
Abortion Choices, The Hastings Center Report 13 (2007) (arguing that the “woman-protective”
rationale relied upon by Carhart is contrary to bioethical principles and confuses substantive issues).
In addition to the government’s “moral” interest in the manner in which the fetus is killed, Justice
Kennedy opined that the federal ban could potentially reduce second-trimester abortions, but failed
to explain how “partial-birth” abortion bans would achieve this goal. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 160. As
Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban in fact “saves not a
single fetus from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.” Id. at 181
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Carhart’s portrayal of women evokes a century-old societal view of
femininity.7 The Carhart Court’s cabined view of women’s decision-making
capacity reflects a gender-stereotyped view of women’s nature.8 The Court also
exposed its discriminatory view of women as decision-makers by articulating a
new paradigm of “informed consent” in the abortion context that controverts
well-established rules of patients’ right to informed consent in healthcare law.
This article focuses on Carhart’s disturbing reasoning—that competent adult
women lack the capacity to determine for themselves what is best for their own
health—and evaluates its implications in the abortion context and in other areas
of medical treatment related to pregnancy. This article criticizes the womanprotective anti-abortion claim from the perspective of healthcare law by
comparing the treatment of women’s healthcare decision-making under
abortion law to patient decision-making under more general law. A close
examination of the law on healthcare decision-making yields the conclusion
that, compared to how the law treats all other competent adult patient decisionmaking, abortion law treats pregnant women unequally. This article argues that
the denial of pregnant women’s capacity to make abortion decisions
unjustifiably diverges from the law’s treatment of patient decision-making in
both the private law doctrine of informed consent and in public law
constitutional cases governing medical decision-making. In no other area of
healthcare does the State override a competent adult’s right to consent to a
medical procedure that falls within the bounds of proven and accepted medical
practice, and in fact may be physically safer for the patient, based on the State’s
unsubstantiated view that the treatment will be psychologically harmful to the
patient. The law only subjects the gender-specific abortion decision to this kind
of doubt about patient decision-making capacity, therefore denying that women
have the same ability as men to make informed healthcare decisions.9 The law’s
unequal treatment of women as decision-makers further bolsters the argument
articulated by feminist legal scholars that restrictions on abortion are
manifestations of sex discrimination.10
7. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873) (permitting states to deny women admission
to the Bar). In his concurrence, Justice Bradley famously declared: “The paramount destiny and
mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.” Id. at 141.
8. See, e.g., Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 5, at 1029–50 (arguing that the use of
informed consent discourse to justify restrictions on abortion rests on sex-based stereotypes about
women’s roles and women’s agency, therefore violating equal protection).
9. The Supreme Court infamously concluded that discrimination based on pregnancy does not
on its face amount to sex discrimination because the discrimination is not between men and women,
but between “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.” Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496 n.20
(1974). See also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140 (1976) (concluding for similar reasons
that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on pregnancy). Geduldig has been heavily
criticized by feminist legal scholars. Furthermore, Congress rejected the Supreme Court’s reasoning
when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, which recognizes that pregnancy-related
discrimination is a form of sex discrimination in the employment context. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 983 (1984) (noting that criticizing
Geduldig’s reasoning became “a cottage industry” among scholars); Wendy W. Williams, Equality’s
Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
325 (1984/85) (arguing that discrimination related to pregnancy is sex discrimination).
10. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Unraveling the “Seamless Garment”: Loose Threads in Pro-Life
Progressivism, 2 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 294, 296–300 (2005); David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference:
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This article begins by examining the tort law doctrine of informed consent.
Informed consent law serves primarily to respect patient self-determination and
autonomy. The article then contrasts the tort doctrine of informed consent with
abortion law’s approach to informed consent. It seeks to disentangle “informed
consent” as used in abortion law from informed consent law generally. A
growing disrespect for women’s decision-making capabilities has been
underway for some time in the abortion context, which the Court’s approval of
abortion-specific “informed consent” regulations particularly reveals. Abortion
law invokes and then misuses “informed consent” terminology. These so-called
“informed consent” to abortion regulations belie a deep suspicion of women as
medical (and moral) decision-makers. This article traces the history of the
Supreme Court’s acceptance of abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation,
starting with its decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.11 The Casey opinion
characterized women as incapable decision-makers in need of the State’s
“protection” provided through biased information disguised as “informed
consent” legislation.12 Abortion law’s divergence from traditional informed
consent law culminated in Carhart, which turned established informed consent
doctrine on its head by completely denying women’s capacity to give consent to
treatment. Carhart’s stark departure from informed consent law properly
understood exposes abortion law’s sex discriminatory treatment of women as
healthcare decision-makers.
In order to further flesh out the law’s approach to medical decisionmaking, this article next considers how constitutional law treats patient
decision-making capacity. In tort law, the rule of informed consent firmly
respects a patient’s ability to make her own medical decisions, at least in
principle.13 Although its basic principle of respect for patient autonomy has at
times guided the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Due Process Clause as
applied to individuals’ right to healthcare decision-making, informed consent
doctrine primarily governs the physician-patient relationship, not the
relationship of the State to the patient.14 With respect to the State-patient
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, (1995);
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women’s Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
137; Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
11. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey upheld the right to abortion, but established a new, less protective
test for abortion rights than the strict scrutiny applied in Roe v. Wade. See id. at 876–77. Under Casey,
an abortion regulation is invalid if it amounts to an “undue burden.” Id. at 876–77. A finding of an
undue burden “is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.” Id. at
877.
12. See id. at 882 (discussing need for abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation in order
to protect women from psychological harm).
13. There is a rich literature on informed consent law, which includes extensive criticism of the
doctrine as applied in clinical practice and by the courts. See, e.g., JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF
DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899 (1994).
A full discussion of whether informed consent law achieves its goal of furthering patient autonomy
in the clinical setting is beyond the scope of this article.
14. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (acknowledging
common law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment based in part on law of informed
consent). See infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing Cruzan).
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relationship, the picture of patient decision-making is more complex. Although
under private law we clearly allocate decision-making power to the patient
rather than the physician, under constitutional law—public law—we sometimes
allocate decision-making power to the government rather than the patient for
the sake of protecting public health.15 The Supreme Court has permitted
government to impose some limits on individuals’ healthcare decision-making.
These limits act as exceptions to the general rule of patient informed consent.
Nevertheless, public health restrictions on patient choice do not undermine the
notion that the law generally should respect the decision-making abilities of
competent adult patients. Even under precedents that allow government limits
on patient choice, the State cannot endanger patient health in order to
paternalistically protect patients from unproven risks of psychological harm that
may result from their own supposedly poor medical decision-making.
Therefore, not only does Carhart eviscerate the longstanding principle of respect
for patients’ decision-making capacity enshrined in the doctrine of informed
consent, it also finds no support in precedent related to healthcare decisionmaking in the field of constitutional law.
In sum, only in the abortion context does the law deny a competent adult’s
capacity to determine which healthcare choice they will least regret. By denying
women’s capacity for sound medical decision-making, the Court justifies the
government’s denial of women’s autonomy and excuses the imposition of the
State’s substitute judgment on pregnant women. In addition, Carhart’s
characterization of women as incompetent decision-makers may resonate with
courts and legislatures since it reflects “ancient notions about women’s place in
the family and under the Constitution.”16 The woman-protective rationale for
restricting abortion has dangerous implications for women’s equality and
liberty, and not only within abortion law. The Carhart Court’s inversion of
informed consent principles could lead to much more extensive regulation of
pregnancy in the larger context of “maternal-fetal conflicts.”17
This article proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief overview of
“partial-birth” abortion bans in the United States, like that upheld in Gonzales v.
Carhart. In particular, this review will trace the history of state “partial-birth”
abortion bans and the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban, as well as the prior
Supreme Court decision, Stenberg v. Carhart,18 which struck down a state
“partial-birth” abortion statute. Part II then summarizes the Supreme Court’s
reversal of course in Gonzales v. Carhart.

15. See Jessie B. Hill, The Constitutional Right to Make Medical Treatment Decisions: A Tale of Two
Doctrines, 86 TEX. L. REV. 277, 281–83 (2007) [hereinafter Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines]. Hill describes
constitutional law precedents related to medical treatment as falling into two models, an
“Autonomy Model” and a “Public Health Model.” These models emphasize individual autonomy in
decision making or focus on the police power of the state over individual rights, respectively. See id.
at 294–95. Hill argues that in Carhart the Court attempted to justify the federal “partial-birth”
abortion ban as a public health type of restriction. See id. at 320.
16. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
17. See infra Part V. See also Judith Resnik, Courts and Democracy: The Production and Reproduction
of Constitutional Conflict, THE FOUNDATION FOR LAW, JUSTICE AND SOCIETY 5 (2008) (arguing that
Carhart’s reasoning could lead to broader government regulation of pregnant women).
18. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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Part III demonstrates that abortion law, although invoking “informed
consent” as a reason for abortion restrictions, has diverged far from the law of
informed consent. It briefly reviews the development of the tort law doctrine of
informed consent in the United States and describes the basic principles
underlying informed consent in the healthcare context. Prior to the Carhart
decision, abortion law had already diverged from the general law of informed
consent by doubting women’s equal capacity to make healthcare decisions. Part
III traces this shifting analysis of so-called “informed consent” statutes specific
to abortion, critically examines Carhart’s reasoning regarding women’s capacity
to consent to abortion-related medical treatment, and examines the impact of the
Court’s validation of the woman-protective anti-abortion claim.
Finally, Part IV argues that contrary to Justice Kennedy’s suggestion,
Carhart’s woman-protective reasoning finds no support in precedent governing
the State’s limited ability to override patient decision-making under the
Constitution. In particular, the Supreme Court has permitted the government to
mandate vaccination, ban certain controlled substances, restrict access to
experimental medications, and ban physician assisted suicide. Yet, the State
does not endanger patients’ physical health in any of these healthcare situations
based on the State’s unsubstantiated belief that the treatment will be
psychologically detrimental to the patient.
This article concludes that the woman-protective rationale adopted in
Carhart is likely to continue to undermine the equal treatment of women as
healthcare decision-makers in the abortion context and beyond.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF “PARTIAL-BIRTH” ABORTION BANS
More than one million elective abortions are performed each year in the
United States, making it one of the nation’s most common surgical procedures.19
The vast majority of these abortions occur in the first trimester, with second
trimester abortions occurring only in approximately 12% of all abortions.20
Nevertheless, this leaves over 100,000 women per year seeking abortions in the
second trimester. Second-trimester procedures “are potentially more morbid
because of the increased size of fetal and placental tissue, increased blood
volumes and a distended uterus with decreased resistance.”21 Furthermore,
women seeking second trimester abortions are medically “a very important
group, including virtually all patients who have antenatal diagnosis of
congenital anomalies, many women with serious illness, and a disproportionate
share of very young women.”22 In other words, second trimester abortion
patients represent the most vulnerable group of women, including the very sick,
the very young and the very poor.23
19. Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Abortion Incidence and Services in the United States
in 2000, 35 PERSPECTIVES IN SEXUAL AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 6, 8 (2003).
20. David K. Turok et al., Second Trimester Termination of Pregnancy: A Review By Site and
Procedure Type, 77 CONTRACEPTION 155, 155 (2008).
21. Id.
22. Phillip G. Stubblefield et al., Methods for Induced Abortion, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
(ACOG) 174, 179 (July 2004).
23. See Diana G. Foster et al., Predictors of Delay in Each Step Leading to an Abortion, 77
CONTRACEPTION 289, 291–93 (2008).
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The abortion regulation at issue in Gonzales v. Carhart purports to ban a
method of second trimester abortion called “partial-birth” abortion by its
opponents. “Partial-birth” abortion is not a medical term, but a political one.24 In
a 1992 National Abortion Federation meeting, an Ohio physician presented a
paper entitled “Dilation and Extraction for Late Second Trimester Abortion,”
describing the procedure also known as “partial-birth abortion.”25 Anti-abortion
groups obtained information about the procedure, invented the term “partialbirth” abortion and took their plan of action to the states.26 Since 1995, thirty-one
states have enacted “partial-birth” abortion bans,27 not including new bans
proposed in several states since the Carhart decision.28
The safest and most commonly used procedure for terminating a
pregnancy in the second-trimester is Dilation and Evacuation (“D&E”).29 In a
D&E procedure, the physician dilates the cervix and evacuates the fetus and
placenta using forceps.30 Physicians may also choose to use a variation of the
D&E procedure, which is known as “intact” D&E.31 In an intact D&E procedure,
the physician dilates the cervix and evacuates the fetus, but accomplishes the
evacuation with the fetus largely intact.32 Proponents of “partial-birth” abortion
bans argue that the term “partial-birth” abortion only applies to the intact D&E
procedure, and not to the more commonly used non-intact version of D&E.
Proponents of these bans also claim that the intact D&E method is never
medically necessary.33 However, physicians experienced in second trimester
abortion procedures have consistently stated that the intact version of D&E is

24. Cynthia Gorney, Gambling with Abortion: Why Both Sides Think They Have Everything to Lose,
HARPER’S MAG., Nov. 2004 at 33–34.
25. Id. at 34, 38.
26. See id. at 38 (describing the strategically deceptive language created by anti-choice advocates
to advance so-called “partial-birth” abortion bans).
27. See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief, Bans on “Partial-Birth” Abortion, August 1,
2008.
28. See id. As of April 2009, the following 31 states have enacted bans on “partial-birth” abortion
since Carhart: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin. See http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/
spibs/spib_BPBA.pdf.
29. Stephen T. Chasen et al., Dilation and Evacuation at ≥ 20 Weeks: Comparison of Operative
Techniques, 190 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1180, 1180 (2004) (“Dilation
and evacuation is the most common method used for second trimester abortion and is considered
the safest abortion technique in the second trimester.”).
30. Stubblefield, supra note 22, at 179. See also Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 852–99
(D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124
(2007) (district court findings of fact describing doctor’s testimony regarding abortion procedures).
31. Gonzales v. Carhart held that the federal abortion ban criminalizes the intentional use of only
one method of second-trimester abortion, “intact D&E,” but the medical literature labels this same
procedure with various names: “intact D&E,” “intact D&X,” or “D&X.” See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 136–37 (2007). This paper will refer to the procedure as “intact D&E.”
32. See Stubblefield, supra note 22; Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 925–28 (2000) (describing
various abortion procedures).
33. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 931–32 (summarizing Nebraska’s argument that intact D&E is never
medically necessary).
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safer for some patients.34 Nevertheless, in 2003 Congress enacted the first federal
abortion regulation, a ban on “partial-birth” abortion which did not contain an
exception to protect women’s health.
The federal ban defines “partial-birth” abortion as follows:
[T]he term “partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which the person
performing the abortion—(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a
living fetus until, in the case of head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is
outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of
the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose
of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered
living fetus . . . .35

The statute subjects physicians who violate the ban to criminal punishment,
including imprisonment for up to two years, and to civil liability.36 In addition
to the federal ban, a number of states have enacted their own “partial-birth”
abortion bans, each of which may define the term differently.37 Whether the
federal ban and various state bans will in fact apply only to the “intact” D&E
method of abortion is a matter of ongoing contention.38
Before Gonzales v. Carhart, in Stenberg v. Carhart,39 a bare 5-4 majority of the
Supreme Court struck down Nebraska’s ban on “partial-birth” abortion.40 The
Court concluded that the ban violated a woman’s constitutional right to seek an
abortion for two separate reasons. First, the Nebraska law lacked any exception
for cases when the procedure was needed to preserve the woman’s health.41
Second, the ban amounted to an undue burden on the right to seek pre-viability
abortions because the law as written was so vague it could be applied to ban
non-intact D&E, the most commonly used method of second-trimester
abortion.42
34. See Carhart, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1012–27 (summarizing testimony of physicians and district
court findings of fact that intact D&E is medically necessary for some women). See also Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1032–35 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v.
Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 480–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1)(A) (2003).
36. 18 U.S.C § 1531(a) (2003).
37. See Nancy Kubasek & Daniel Tagliarina, Failed Lessons of History: The Predictable Shortcomings
of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, 6 U. MD. L. J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 159, 163–96
(2006). See also Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Herring, 527 F.3d 128 (4th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 2009 WL 1783515
(4th Cir. 2009) (en banc). (striking down Virginia’s “partial-birth” abortion ban because worded
sufficiently differently than federal ban such that it violated Due Process).
38. Because of the ways in which statutes are worded, these laws could apply to physicians
performing non-intact D&E procedures as well. See Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales,
435 F.3d 1163, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (holding that the federal “partialbirth” abortion ban was unconstitutionally vague because it did not clearly define the prohibited
medical procedures, therefore, physicians were deprived of fair notice and enforcement would be
arbitrary).
39. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 938.
42. Id. at 941–46. Similarly to Stenberg, and prior to the Carhart decision, lower federal courts
had struck down state “partial-birth” abortion bans for three reasons: (1) violation of women’s right
to privacy because the ban constituted an “undue burden” on the woman’s right to choose abortion
pre-viability; (2) vagueness in the language of the statute; and (3) the failure to include a health
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In reaction to Stenberg, anti-abortion groups sought to have the U.S.
Congress pass a federal “partial-birth” abortion ban, but President Clinton twice
vetoed proposed legislation.43 Subsequent Congresses considered similar bans,
until finally on November 5, 2003, George W. Bush signed the Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 (“the Act”).44 The Act was immediately challenged in
three federal courts. All six courts that reviewed the Act—three district courts
and three appellate courts—found the Act unconstitutional.45
Despite the lack of a circuit split, the Supreme Court granted review of
decisions from both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Previously in Stenberg,
Justice O’Connor had provided the crucial fifth vote to strike down Nebraska’s
“partial-birth” abortion ban,46 but given the changed composition of the Court
commentators speculated that the new conservative majority would overrule
Stenberg outright.47 In fact, the Carhart Court took the approach of surreptiously
overruling precedent.48 The majority opinion claimed to uphold Stenberg by
distinguishing the terms of the statutes at issue in the two cases, but instead
gutted Stenberg’s main principles as well as reversed longstanding precedent
requiring a health exception in abortion regulations.49

exception. An abortion regulation is unconstitutional if it amounts to an “undue burden,” which
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey defined as a “substantial obstacle” placed in the path
of the woman seeking an abortion. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 869 (1992). Some “partial-birth” abortion bans were also overturned because of unconstitutional
spousal consent or parental consent requirements. See Kubasek & Tagliarina, supra note 37, at 159–65
(noting that eighteen of these statutes had been challenged in court, seventeen had been overturned
and finding four general reasons why state “partial-birth” abortion bans were struck down: “(1)
vagueness in the language of the statute; (2) a specific reference to a violation of a woman’s right to
privacy due to a consent provision; (3) a more general violation of a woman’s right to privacy by
placing an undue burden on the woman by making it more difficult to obtain safe abortions; and (4)
failing to include an exception to protect the mother’s health or her life.”).
43. Kubasek & Tagliarina, supra note 37, at 186–88.
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
45. See Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2006); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v.
Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 285 (2d Cir. 2006); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1024–27 (D. Neb.
2004); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 480–82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 1000–02 (N.D. Cal. 2004). The Second and
Eighth Circuits struck down the Act solely on the ground that it did not contain a health exception.
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 290 (2d Cir. 2006); Carhart, 413 F.3d at 803–04. The
Eighth Circuit concluded that Stenberg requires a health exception whenever “substantial medical
authority” supports the medical necessity of a banned procedure, and found that such authority
existed with respect to intact D&E. Carhart, 413 F.3d at 796. The Ninth Circuit similarly struck down
the Act, but on three separate grounds: (1) the Act places an undue burden on women’s ability to
obtain pre-viability abortions; (2) the Act is unconstitutionally vague; and (3) the Act fails to include
a health exception. Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163, 1171–72 (9th Cir.
2006).
46. Stenberg, 530 U.S. 914, 947–49 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47. See Michael C. Dorf, Nineteenth Annual Supreme Court Review: Abortion Rights, 23 TOURO L.
REV. 815, 820–21 (2008) (discussing speculation that the Court would overrule Stenberg).
48. Id. (arguing that Carhart claimed to merely distinguish Stenberg although in fact it
contradicted prior holdings); David Franklin, Looking Through Both Ends of the Telescope: Facial
Challenges and the Roberts Court, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 689 (2009) (arguing that Carhart is
impossible to reconcile with Stenberg).
49. See Maya Manian, Rights, Remedies and Facial Challenges, 36 HAST. CON. L.Q. 611 (2009).
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In the 5-4 decision written by Justice Kennedy, Carhart upheld the
constitutionality of the Act. The Court concluded that the Act does not restrict
first-trimester abortions.50 The Court also decided that the Act does not prohibit
what Justice Kennedy termed a “standard” D&E, but only prohibits intact
D&E.51
In upholding the Act, the Court rejected three constitutional claims put
forth by the physicians challenging its provisions. First, the physicians argued
that the Act places an undue burden on women’s right to choose abortion previability because its operative language is so vague that it also bans non-intact
D&E, the safest and most commonly used method of second-trimester
abortion.52 With respect to the undue burden argument, the Court interpreted
the Act to apply only when a physician “intends” to perform an intact D&E. The
plaintiff physicians had presented evidence that any D&E has the potential to
violate the Act, because doctors cannot predict beforehand how much the cervix
will dilate. Either variation of the D&E requires that physicians dilate the cervix
in order to evacuate the fetus and placenta. If the cervix dilates to a sufficient
degree, the fetus may inadvertently be removed intact and thus subject
physicians to criminal punishment under the Act. Although the Court
acknowledged that a D&E procedure could “accidentally” result in the removal
of an intact fetus,53 the Court opined that the Act’s intent requirement would
“preclude liability from attaching to an accidental intact D&E.”54 The Court also
claimed that “an intact delivery is almost always a conscious choice rather than
a happenstance,” because physicians may alter the techniques of the procedure
in a manner that decreases the likelihood of an intact D&E.55
Second, the Court rejected the physicians’ claim that the Act is
unconstitutionally vague because it imposes criminal liability without providing
sufficient notice to physicians of what procedures are banned and encourages
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.56 The Court concluded that the
“anatomical landmarks” laid out in the Act, plus the requirement of an “overt
50. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 128 (2007).
51. Id. The Court attempted to differentiate between “standard” D&E and “intact” D&E as
defined in the Act. However, the implications of the Act’s precise restrictions for pregnant women
seeking abortions in the second-trimester are far from clear. See ACLU Memo (unprivileged),
Provider Compliance With The Federal Abortion Ban, 18 U.S.C. § 1531, April 19, 2007 (on file with
author).
52. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 150–51.
53. Id. at 155 (“A fetus is only delivered largely intact in a small fraction of the overall number
of D&E abortions.” (citing Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 965 (N.D. Cal.
2004))).
54. Id.
55. See id. at 155–56 (“Doctors, for example, may remove the fetus in a manner that will increase
the chances of an intact delivery. . . . And intact D&E is usually described as involving some manner
of serial dilation . . . . Doctors who do not seek to obtain this serial dilation perform an intact D&E on
far fewer occasions.”). This statement may not be medically accurate. See Tracy A. Weitz & Susan
Yanow, Implications of the Federal Abortion Ban for Women’s Health in the United States,16
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 99, 103 (2008) (noting that medical experts have stated that
adequate dilation is “a critical factor in the safety of any D&E” and the Court’s emphasis on dilation
as proof of intent “may lead some providers not to dilate adequately for fear of appearing to induce
an intact D&E”).
56. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 148–50.

Manian Macro 2.doc

8/3/2009 10:33:37 AM

THE IRRATIONAL WOMAN

233

act” killing the fetus after delivery to an anatomical landmark, made sufficiently
clear to physicians the conduct banned by the Act.57 However, as the evidence
admittedly showed, the non-intact D&E procedure could result in a fetus being
accidentally delivered to the anatomical landmark. Again, the Court
emphasized that the “scienter requirement” alleviated vagueness concerns,
because “[i]f a living fetus is delivered past the critical point by accident or
inadvertence, the Act is inapplicable.”58
Third and most striking, the Court rejected the argument that the Act fails
constitutional scrutiny because it lacks a health exception. Previously, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Court had reaffirmed Roe v. Wade’s 59 holding that
abortion regulations must have an exception to protect women’s health, even
after viability.60 In Stenberg, the Court reaffirmed the requirement for a health
exception whenever “substantial medical authority” supports the medical
necessity of the banned procedure.61 Thus, even where there is a lack of
consensus in the medical community, Stenberg mandated that legislatures err on
the side of protecting women’s health.62 Carhart found exactly the opposite,
holding that legislatures could choose to err on the side of risking women’s
health: “Considerations of marginal safety, including the balance of risks, are
within the legislative competence when the regulation is rational and in pursuit
of legitimate ends.”63 The physicians challenging the Act had presented
substantial evidence, accepted by six different federal courts, that the intact D&E
procedure is medically necessary in some cases, especially for women with
certain medical conditions.64 Although the Act permits physicians to perform an
intact D&E if the physician first causes fetal demise, the evidence also showed
that the methods for causing fetal demise presented health risks to patients.65
The majority in Carhart acknowledged that the requirements of the Act may in
fact endanger women’s health, but nevertheless concluded that legislatures
could impose those risks on women.66
In discussing the health exception, the Court also suggested that it would
not be as amenable to facial challenges to abortion regulations—the typical
manner of challenging abortion restrictions.67 Instead, the Court held that
physicians must seek individual exemptions using as-applied challenges in
order to obtain health exceptions for patients burdened by the Act.68
57. See id. at 147–48 (identifying the “anatomical landmarks” as the points when “either the fetal
head or the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother”).
58. Id. at 148. The Court dismissed the physicians’ argument that the Act would encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id.
59. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
60. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
61. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937–38 (2000).
62. Id.
63. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 166.
64. See id. at 176–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (summarizing district court findings of fact).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 164.
67. Id. at 167–68 (stating that the as-applied challenge in a discrete case “is the proper manner to
protect the health of the woman”).
68. Id. at 168. See also Caitlin Borgmann, Holding Legislatures Constitutionally Accountable Through
Facial Challenges,36 HAST. CON. L.Q. 563 (2009) (arguing that Carhart’s promise of future as-applied
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In a sharply worded dissent, Justice Ginsburg condemned the Court’s
retreat from protecting women’s health. She emphasized that the Court’s
precedents had always mandated exceptions to abortion restrictions for
women’s health “at any stage of pregnancy.”69 She further noted that Stenberg
had expressly rejected a ban on intact D&E due to its lack of a health exception.70
Criticizing Congress’ inaccurate findings of fact, Ginsburg reviewed in detail the
factual findings of three district courts that “the safety advantages of intact D&E
are marked for women with certain medical conditions . . . .”71 Ginsburg found
the Court’s claim that the Act can survive in the face of medical uncertainty
“bewildering”72 and repeatedly stressed that the Court “def[ied] [its]
longstanding precedent affirming the necessity of a health exception, with no
carve-out for circumstances of medical uncertainty.”73
Moreover, Ginsburg argued that the Court’s justifications for upholding
the Act were “flimsy and transparent,” since “the law saves not a single fetus
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion . . . and
surely the statute was not designed to protect the lives or health of pregnant
women.”74 In this regard, Ginsburg remarked on the peculiarities of the Court’s
rhetoric throughout the opinion: “[T]he opinion refers to obstetriciangynecologists and surgeons who perform abortions not by the titles of their
medical specialties, but by the pejorative label ‘abortion doctor’ . . . . A fetus is
described as an ‘unborn child’ and as a ‘baby’; second-trimester, pre-viability
abortions are referred to as ‘late-term’; and the reasoned medical judgments of
highly trained doctors are dismissed as ‘preferences’ motivated by ‘mere
convenience.’”75 Ultimately, Ginsburg concluded that the Act is “irrational”
since it does not further any legitimate government interest. She asserted that
the Act’s true purpose, as well as the purpose of the Court’s defense of the Act,
was to “chip away at a right declared again and again by this Court—and with
increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s lives.”76

challenges to protect women’s health is illusory); Manian, supra note 49, at 618–23 (discussing
implications of Carhart’s dismissal of facial challenges in the abortion context).
69. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 172 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 177 (citing Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 923–28, 1025 (D. Neb. 2004);
Planned Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 982, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Nat’l Abortion
Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 179. Ginsburg also noted that alternatives to intact D&E, such as an injection to kill the
fetus prior to performing the banned procedure or medical induction of labor, is “considered less
safe for many women, and impermissible for others” by medical experts. Id. at 180 n.6.
74. Id. at 181 (emphasis in original).
75. Id. at 186–87.
76. Id. at 191. Ginsburg also criticized the Court’s holding as to whether and when facial
challenges are permitted to abortion restrictions: “It makes no sense to conclude that this facial
challenge fails because respondents have not shown that a health exception is necessary for a large
fraction of second-trimester abortions, including those for which a health exception is necessary: the
very purpose of a health exception is to protect women in exceptional cases.” Id. at 189.
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III. THE PHYSICIAN & PATIENT: INFORMED CONSENT, AUTONOMY & ABORTION LAW
Informed consent law establishes the legal rules regarding patient medical
decision-making, and therefore provides a useful lens through which to critique
abortion law’s treatment of women as healthcare decision-makers. By now a
well-established principle in healthcare law, the common law rule of informed
consent rejects a paternalistic model of patient decision-making in which the
physician makes treatment decisions for the patient and instead embodies a
model recognizing that competent adult patients have the capacity to make their
own medical treatment decisions. The Supreme Court has at times relied on the
private law doctrine of informed consent as a guide in interpreting patients’
rights related to medical treatment under the Due Process Clause.77 If we
applied this same model of patient decision-making to abortion law, we would
see some very different results. This section sets forth the basic principles
underlying the law of informed consent in the physician-patient relationship. It
then compares “informed consent” terminology as used in abortion law. This
comparison exposes abortion law’s treatment of women as less capable decisionmakers than other patients.
A. Informed Consent in the Healthcare Context
An extensive literature has developed on informed consent law.78 This
section provides a brief sketch of the rules and debates surrounding the law of
informed consent. It emphasizes informed consent’s underlying principle of
respect for patient autonomy, which is of special relevance to the question of the
law’s treatment of patient capacity for medical decision-making.
Informed consent doctrine was originally established through the common
law, and has since been codified in all states. Commentators attribute the first
definitive statement of the concept of the informed consent doctrine to Justice
Cardozo’s oft-quoted pronouncement in Schloendorff v. Society of New York
Hospitals: “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient’s consent commits assault.”79 The subsequent
development of informed consent doctrine has largely reflected the Schloendorff
court’s concern with a patient’s right to bodily integrity and self-determination
in medical treatment.80
77. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (relying on
informed consent law in acknowledging a substantive due process right to refuse medical
treatment).
78. See, e.g., Jaime Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 437–45 (2006). See also Dayna Bowen
Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent–Lessons from Social Science, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 150,
154 (Spring 2008).
79. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
80. See Alan Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between
Competing Values in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 413, 420 (stating that the “purpose of
requiring the patient’s consent to treatment is to protect his physical and psychic integrity against
unwanted invasions, and to permit the patient to act as an autonomous, self-determining human
being”(rationale articulated in Pratt v. Davis, 118 Il1. App. 161, 166 (1905), aff'd, 224 11. 300, 79 N.E.
562 (1906))) [hereinafter Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine].
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The term “informed consent” was later used for the first time in the
watershed case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees.81 Salgo
discussed the obligation of physicians to disclose “any facts which are necessary
to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient to the proposed
treatment.”82 The Salgo court opined that rigid rules regarding the specific
content of the disclosure would not be appropriate, recognizing:
[T]hat each patient presents a separate problem, that the patient’s mental and
emotional condition is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that in
discussing the element of risk a certain amount of discretion must be employed
consistent with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed consent.83

In many ways, informed consent law today generally still follows Salgo’s
vision.
The early case law permitting recovery for failure to obtain informed
consent sounded in battery. When the physician performed a procedure without
obtaining the patient’s consent, either because the physician misled the patient
about the nature of the procedure or because the physician exceeded the bounds
of the consent obtained, courts treated the physician’s actions as nonconsensual
contact amounting to a battery.84 For example, in Mohr v. Williams,85 the patient
brought a claim for battery on the ground that the physician operated on her left
ear when she had only consented to an operation on her right ear.86 The court
noted that the operation was performed without negligence, but nevertheless
held that a claim for battery could lie merely upon proof that the operation was
performed without the patient’s consent.87 Mohr emphasized the value of bodily
integrity in allowing liability without proof of bad intent or negligence:
It cannot be doubted that the patient must be consulted, and his consent given,
before a physician may operate upon him . . . . Under a free government, the free
citizen’s first and greatest right, which underlies all others—the right to the
inviolability of his person; in other words, the right to himself—is the subject of
universal acquiescence. . . . 88

The court’s recognition that medical treatment without consent constituted
a battery “was a critical step in establishing patients’ unequivocal right to
81. 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957). See also Matthew, supra note 78, at 154.
82. Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d at 578.
83. Id. Salgo’s rejection of rigid rules of disclosure stands in sharp contrast to today’s abortion
“informed consent” legislation. See infra Part III.C.
84. See, e.g., Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (stating that the
wrong complained of is “not merely negligence,” but trespass of the body); Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (holding that physician was liable for battery because consent to an operation
on the patient’s right ear did not authorize surgery on the left ear); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal.
1972) (“Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and
subsequently performs a substantially different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there
is a clear case of battery.”). See also Note, Abortion Regulation: The Circumscription of State Intervention
by the Doctrine of Informed Consent, 15 GA. L. REV. 681, 694 (1980–1981) [hereinafter Note, Abortion
Regulation].
85. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
86. Id. at 13.
87. Id. at 15–16.
88. Id. at 14 (internal quotations omitted).

Manian Macro 2.doc

8/3/2009 10:33:37 AM

THE IRRATIONAL WOMAN

237

control access to their bodies.”89 The Supreme Court later relied on informed
consent law’s emphasis on protecting bodily integrity to recognize a patient’s
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment under the Due Process Clause.90
Despite the common law requirement of consent to treatment, physicians
could easily evade a battery claim with a generic consent form that in practice
provided patients little opportunity for meaningful consent.91 Courts and
commentators later concluded that patients who are unaware of the risks,
benefits and alternatives to a particular treatment cannot effectively render their
consent to treatment.92 Consent to medical treatment means more than mere
consent to bodily contact; it means respect for patient capacity for selfdetermination given accurate, unbiased information. Thus, the notion of
informed consent also encompasses a duty of the physician to make adequate
disclosures to the patient. Courts have considered failure to provide sufficient
information a breach of the physician’s duty to meet the appropriate standard of
care.93 Hence, informed consent malpractice actions based on lack of adequate
disclosures have sounded in negligence theory rather than battery.
The leading case on the negligence theory of informed consent, Natanson v.
Kline,94 explained that “the relation between the physician and his patient is a
fiduciary one, and therefore the physician has an obligation to make a full and
frank disclosure to the patient of all pertinent facts related to his illness.”95 The
court noted that the physician may be acting “in relatively good faith for the
benefit of the patient” but nevertheless is liable for failure to disclose.96 Natanson
affirmed that the corollary principle to protection of a patient’s bodily integrity
is protection of a patient’s right of decision-making. In particular, Natanson
emphasized that “a doctor might well believe that an operation or form of
treatment is desirable or necessary but the law does not permit him to substitute
his own judgment for that of the patient by any form of artifice or deception.”97
Other jurisdictions followed Natanson, expanding liability for failure to obtain a
patient’s consent from a battery to a negligence theory based on a lack of full
disclosure and broadly establishing a patient’s right to self-determination.98
89. Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in
Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 465 (2000).
90. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (discussed infra
Part IV.B.2). Furthermore, both the private law and constitutional right to refuse medical treatment
are at issue in cases involving forced treatment of pregnant women. See infra Part V.
91. See Oberman, supra note 89, at 465 (describing reasons for the move from battery claims to
negligence claims for lack of informed consent).
92. See id. at 465 n.57 (citing decisions giving rise to a patient's right informed consent to
treatment).
93. See id. at 465; Jay Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 77–81 (1994).
94. 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
95. Id. at 1101–02.
96. Id. at 1100.
97. Id. at 1104.
98. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W. 2d 11 (Mo. 1960) (holding that “doctors owed their
patient in possession of his faculties the duty to inform him generally of the possible serious
collateral hazards” of shock therapy and insulin treatment for mental illness and that they could be
liable in negligence for failure to inform). While there is still ongoing debate on whether and when
informed consent claims should sound in battery as opposed to negligence, the general trend has
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The development of informed consent common law continued in
Canterbury v. Spence,99 one of the leading cases articulating the parameters of
informed consent law.100 There, the court explored the “first principles” of the
doctrine in detail and placed great emphasis on respect for patient decisionmaking capacity.101 Canterbury notably declared: “To the physician, whose
training enables a self-satisfying evaluation, the answer may seem clear, but it is
the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine for himself the
direction in which his interests seem to lie.”102 The court reasoned that informed
consent liability should rest on a patient-based standard of disclosure, because
“[r]espect for the patient’s right of self-determination on particular therapy
demands a standard set by law for physicians rather than one which physicians
may or may not impose upon themselves.”103 Furthermore, Canterbury held that

been to treat cases of failure to disclose as an issue of negligence. See Rubino v. DeFretias, 638 F.
Supp. 182, 185 (D. Ariz. 1986) (discussing the distinction between an informed consent claim
sounding in battery versus negligence); Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Assoc. 465 A.2d 294, 298–99
(Conn. 1983) (explaining the difference between battery theories and negligence theories of informed
consent); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (discussing cases and scholarship on debate
between battery and negligence theories of informed consent and noting that “the trend appears to
be towards categorizing failure to obtain informed consent as negligence” while reserving the
battery theory “for those circumstances when a doctor performs an operation to which the patient
has not consented”); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 685–86 (R.I. 1972) (noting that there “is no
unanimity as to the theory of recovery” for failure of a physician to adequately disclose but the
“prevailing view” is to apply a negligence as opposed to a battery frame). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), TORTS § 892B, cmt. i (1979) (noting that failure to make a sufficient disclosure is regarded
by most courts as presenting the question, not whether there was such a lack of consent as to amount
to a battery, but whether the physician had fulfilled his duty of care by informing the patient under
the appropriate standard).
99. 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The negligence theory generated an ongoing debate in
informed consent law regarding the appropriate scope of physician disclosure necessary to avoid
liability. Natanson held that whether the physician provided full disclosure should be judged on a
physician-based standard, stating that the “duty of the physician to disclose. . . is limited to those
disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or similar
circumstances.” Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1106. The court opined that how the duty of disclosure may
best be discharged to any particular patient “involves primarily a question of medical judgment”
and therefore should be left to the medical profession. Id. Later cases rejected this approach as
insufficient for protecting patient autonomy and instead adopted a patient-based standard.
Canterbury is the leading case on the patient-based approach. See Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 784. A
minority of U.S. jurisdictions follow Canterbury’s patient-centered perspective. See Cobbs v. Grant,
502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (adopting patient-based approach to informed consent and stating:
“Unlimited discretion in the physician is irreconcilable with the basic right of the patient to make the
ultimate informed decision regarding the course of treatment to which he knowledgeably consents
to be subjected”); See also Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 687 (R.I. 1972) (“Since the patient’s right
to make his decision in light of his own individual value judgment is the very essence of his freedom
of choice . . . it should not be left entirely to the medical profession to determine what the patient
should be told.”). A slight majority of states have adopted the physician-based approach to informed
consent, as articulated in Natanson. See Matthew, supra note 78, at 152. See also Natanson v. Klein, 350
P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
100. Canterbury, 464 F.2d. at 781.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 784. “Any definition of scope in terms purely of a professional standard is at odds with
the patient’s prerogative to decide on projected therapy himself. That prerogative, we have said, is at
the very foundation of the duty to disclose, and both the patient’s right to know and the physician’s
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the disclosure must include unbiased information on all “material” risks,
defining material risk as when “a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient’s position, would be likely to attach
significance to the risk in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed
therapy.”104
Legal liability for failure to provide information necessary to informed
consent ultimately hinges on proof that the patient would have decided upon a
different course of treatment or no treatment at all had there been full
disclosure. Most significantly, informed consent law compels the disclosure only
of accurate medical information consistent with the expert knowledge of the
medical community.105 Although debate continues as to the appropriate
standards for determining the scope of information to be provided to patients,
the law of informed consent consistently “reflects the notion of patient control
and self-determination.”106
A corollary to the right of informed consent is the patient’s right to refuse
medical treatment. In fact, the term informed “consent” is a bit misleading,
because patients have the right not only to make the ultimate decision whether
to accept treatment (consent), but also to refuse treatment entirely.107 Under the
common law, the right to refuse medical treatment grew out of the doctrines of
trespass and battery, which were applied to unauthorized contact by a
physician.108 Thus, just as courts applied a claim of battery where physicians
failed to obtain consent to a procedure or performed a different procedure than
the one to which the patient consented, forced medical treatment amounted to a
battery. Courts eventually recognized a claim of battery for forced medical
treatment even in cases where the patient refused life-saving medical treatment.
As one court stated, “[there is] a well-established rule of general law . . . that it is
the patient, not the physician, who ultimately decides if treatment—any
correlative obligation to tell him are diluted to the extent that its compass is dictated by the medical
profession.” Id. at 786.
104. Id. at 787. Courts have also held that physicians must disclose “personal interests unrelated
to the patient’s health” that may affect their medical judgment, such as financial and research
interests in the patient’s treatment. See Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990).
105. See Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled
Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 969–70 (2007).
106. Matthew, supra note 78, at 156; Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic
Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 347 (1974) (stating that Natanson v. Kline and its
progeny “carried the law beyond merely giving body to ‘the wish on the part of the individual to be
his own master . . . to be a subject, not an object,’ to include the rational processes involved in the
desire”); Oberman, supra note 89, at 465 (stating that the law on “the right to make an informed
consent establishes with utter certainty the principle that doctors may not impose medical treatment
upon their patients, even if they believe such treatment to be in the patient’s best interests, unless
and until the patient permits the doctor to do so”).
107. Natanson v. Kline discussed the importance of the right to informed refusal of treatment:
“Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self determination. It follows that
each man is considered to be master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly
prohibit the performance of lifesaving surgery, or other medical treatment.” Natanson v. Klein, 350
P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960).
108. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 294 n.4 (1982) (stating that “the right to refuse any medical
treatment emerged from the doctrines of trespass and battery, which were applied to unauthorized
touchings by a physician”).
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treatment—is to be given at all . . . . The rule has never been qualified in its
application by either the nature or purpose of the treatment, or the gravity of the
consequences of acceding to or foregoing it.”109
In sum, battery cases focus on the patient’s consent to the specific treatment
or right to refuse treatment in order to respect the patient’s bodily integrity,
while negligence cases focus on the physician’s duty to inform in order to
respect the patient’s right to make his or her own healthcare decisions. These
twin values of bodily integrity and self-determination reflect the key underlying
principle of informed consent doctrine: respect for patient autonomy.110
Although a number of different rationales have been proposed in support of
informed consent rules, informed consent law primarily serves to “protect
patient dignity and autonomy.”111 As Peter Schuck argues,
The most fundamental normative argument in favor of requiring health care
providers to obtain patients’ informed consent to medical treatments proceeds
from the principle of autonomy—the notion that each mature individual has a
right to make the basic choices that affect her life prospects.112

Numerous scholars have noted that the doctrine operates primarily to
respect the capacity of competent adults to make autonomous decisions.113
109. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452, 1455 (D.D.C. 1985). See also
Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 91 (Me. 1974) (“The rationale of this rule lies in the fact that every
competent adult has the right to forego treatment, or even cure, if it entails what for him are
intolerable consequences or risks, however unwise his sense of values may be to others.”).
110. See King & Moulton, supra note 78, at 437 (stating that informed consent “was originally
derived from the ethical principle of personal autonomy and its subsets: self-determination and
bodily integrity”); Note, The Abortion Alternative and the Patient’s Right to Know, WAS. U.L.Q. 167, 175
(1978) (“The modern doctrine of ‘informed consent’ . . . is a merger of two fundamental principles of
Anglo-American jurisprudence: the fiduciary relationship of the doctor to his patient and the basic
right of self-determination articulated in the early consent cases.”). See also TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 120–181 (4th ed. 1994) (describing importance
of autonomy principle in legal and ethical rules of informed consent).
111. Matthew, supra note 78, at 152–53. Matthew argues that informed consent law should also
reflect the ethical principles of beneficence and non-malfeasance, and not simply patient autonomy.
112. Schuck, supra note 13, at 924. See also Matthew, supra note 78, at 155 (demonstrating that the
principal justification of informed consent has shifted from a reflection of the three ethical principles
of physician beneficence, non-malfeasance, and autonomy, to a sole emphasis on autonomy).
113. See, e.g., Alan Meisel et al., Toward a Model of the Legal Doctrine of Informed Consent, 134 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 285, 286 (1977) (“The doctrine of informed consent both reflects and enforces the ancient
concern of Anglo-American law with the individual’s right to be free from the conduct of others that
affronts bodily integrity, privacy, and individual autonomy.”) [hereinafter Meisel, Toward a Model];
Post, supra note 105, at 969–70 (noting that basic purpose of informed consent doctrine is to respect
patient’s right to choose her treatment and to ensure that patient obtains necessary information from
the physician in order to do so). Case law has also emphasized that informed consent protects
patient autonomy both by preserving patients’ bodily integrity and by respecting patients’ capacity
for decision-making. See, e.g., Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605–06 (Cal. 1993) (describing informed
consent doctrine as “the legal recognition of the medical patient’s protectable interest in autonomous
decision-making”); Truman v. Thomas, 611 P.2d 902, 906 (Cal. 1980) (stating that the “duty to
disclose was imposed . . . so that patients might meaningfully exercise their right to make decisions
about their own bodies.”); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1972) (“The weighing of these
[medical] risks against the individual subjective fears and hopes of the patient is not an expert skill.
Such evaluation and decision is a nonmedical judgment reserved to the patient alone.”). Similarly, a
government study concluded that the ethical notion of informed consent “rests on three closely
interrelated elements”: (1) capacity to make decisions about their care; (2) voluntary participation in
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Although there continues to be much debate about whether informed
consent functions to its ideal in clinical practice,114 in principle at least, informed
consent law reinforces the notion that competent adults have the capacity to
make their own healthcare decisions.115 There are some limited exceptions to the
doctrine of informed consent; however, none of these exceptions undermine the
fundamental principle that the law should protect competent adult patients’
decision-making authority.116 Informed consent law “does not accept the
paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because
divulgence might prompt the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the
patient really needs,” because “that attitude presumes instability or perversity
for even the normal patient, and runs counter to the foundation principle that
the patient should and ordinarily can make the choice for himself.”117
The twin values of bodily integrity and self-determination, protected by
informed consent, also underlie the “right to privacy” line of cases that support

these decisions; (3) adequate, appropriate information to make the decisions. See THE PRESIDENT’S
COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH REPORT (1982).
114. See, e.g., Matthew, supra note 78, at 150–51 (describing critiques of informed consent law).
115. The American Medical Association’s Code of Ethics reflects and reinforces the legal
doctrine. American Medical Association, Medical Code of Ethics, 2006, http://www.ama-assn.org/ ama/
pub/category/2512.html.
116. There are four exceptions to the doctrine of informed consent: (1) emergencies; (2)
incompetent patients (mentally disabled and minors); (3) patient waiver; and (4) therapeutic
privilege. Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine, supra note 80, at 433 (discussing
all four exceptions). The emergency exception and incompetency exception are closely related, as
“emergency” situations often involve cases in which the patient is unable to give consent. Id. at 438–
39. Thus, neither involves competent adult patients. The waiver exception “is completely in keeping
with the values sought to be promoted by informed consent,” since it respects the patient as ultimate
decision-maker even if the decision is to refuse information. Id. at 459. The therapeutic exception is
the most controversial. The therapeutic exception permits physicians to withhold information in
specific cases if the information will do more harm than good for the patient. This is a highly
criticized exception and generally not cited in the case law as a defense to failure to obtain informed
consent. Any application of the exception must be determined on a case-by-case, patient-by-patient
basis. Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Assoc., 465 A.2d 294, 292 (Conn. 1983) (noting that only very
limited recognition has been given to the “therapeutic privilege” of a physician to withhold
information “where disclosure might jeopardize a course of therapy”). See also Cobbs, 502 P.2d at
4410–11 (“A patient should be denied the opportunity to weigh the risks only where it is evident he
cannot evaluate the data, as for example, where there is an emergency or the patient is a child or
incompetent . . . . In all cases other than the foregoing, the decision whether or not to undertake
treatment is vested in the party most directly affected: the patient.”). In Canterbury v. Spence, the
court noted a narrow exception to informed consent “when risk disclosure poses such a threat of
detriment to the patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of view.”
464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Canterbury emphasized that this therapeutic privilege “must be
carefully circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself.” Id.
Furthermore, Canterbury stressed that even the therapeutic privilege “does not accept the
paternalistic notion that the physician may remain silent simply because divulgence might prompt
the patient to forego therapy the physician feels the patient really needs.” Id. Scholars have also
criticized the therapeutic exception and proposed its abolition. See Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the
Informed Consent Doctrine, supra note 80, at 460–67 (noting that the therapeutic privilege is much
discussed in the literature although “few cases turn on its application” and arguing for its abolition).
117. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (discussing therapeutic exception to informed consent doctrine).
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the constitutional right to abortion.118 Yet, comparing the law of informed
consent to abortion law reveals a stark difference in how the law views pregnant
women as decision-makers. Abortion law ignores the long history of protection
for patient decision-making capacity that has been well-established in informed
consent law.
B. “Informed Consent” to Abortion from Roe to Casey
For a period of time, under the rules as established in Roe v. Wade,119 the
law generally treated women as entitled to autonomy in their abortion decisionmaking similar to other patients. Both the Supreme Court and lower courts’ use
of the general law of informed consent to guide the analysis of abortion-specific
“informed consent” regulations reflected this equal treatment of women. In part
because the courts viewed female patients seeking abortion as equally capable
decision-makers as other patients, courts conformed the requirements of
abortion “informed consent” to informed consent law as applied to all other
patients.
However, abortion law’s treatment of women as decision-makers has been
diverging from informed consent law’s treatment of patient decision-making at
least since the Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.120 This
section reviews the transformation of the Supreme Court’s view of “informed
consent” as it relates to abortion from Roe to Casey. It disentangles “informed

118. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992); Louis
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1419–22 (1974) (“In its broadest uses, privacy
is as old as law, implicated in the concept of the individual and all that is ascribed to the
individual.”); Meisel, The “Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine, supra note 80, at 431 n.70
(noting that the “‘presumption of individual self-determination’ is the common-law analog of the
constitutional right to privacy. If this right is to be curtailed by the assertion of a societal ‘health’
interest, there is a heavy burden upon the proponent of that interest to demonstrate why it should
predominate in a particular case.”). For example, the Supreme Court has explicitly relied on
informed consent law in acknowledging a substantive due process right to refuse life-saving medical
treatment. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t. of Health, the Court, using informed consent law as a
guide to interpreting Due Process Clause protections for patients, stated in dicta that Constitution
protects a right to refuse life-saving medical treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t. of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990), discussed infra Part IV.B.2. Cruzan emphasized: “No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person . . . .” Id. at 269 (citing Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). Thus, a competent adult patient’s right to refuse even life-saving medical
treatment is established both in private law and in public law based on the principle that competent
adults are capable of making important healthcare decisions. Michelle Oberman notes that the right
of competent adults to refuse medical treatment is so well-established that her research did not
unearth a single case after 1972 forcing medical treatment upon a patient solely for her own benefit.
Oberman, supra note 89, at 467. Interestingly, courts have often tolerated violations of the right to
refuse medical treatment only in cases involving women who are mothers of young children. See,
e.g., Winthrop Univ. Hosp. v. Hess, 490 N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Cty. 1985) (court ordered
blood transfusion for religious objector because she was the mother of an infant and had explained
that her objection was to the signing of the consent, not the transfusion itself); In re President & Dir.
Of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (ordering blood transfusion for mother of
infant). But see In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435, 441–42 (1965) (holding lower court erred in
ordered blood transfusion for woman whose children were grown).
119. 410 U.S. 130 (1973).
120. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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consent” as (mis)used in abortion law from the general law of informed consent
and demonstrates that abortion law has been treating women as less capable
decision-makers for some time, well prior to Carhart.
In the landmark 1973 ruling, Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that state
bans on access to abortion violated a woman’s constitutional rights under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.121 The Court grounded its
decision in a line of “privacy” cases, which recognized the right of the
individual to make decisions with respect to “marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.”122 The
Court concluded that these rights of privacy in family life encompassed the right
of a woman to decide whether to carry her pregnancy to term.
Roe provided extensive protection for women’s constitutional right to
abortion and declared that the right to abortion is a “fundamental right,”
meaning that states could restrict access to abortion only where there is a
“compelling State interest.”123 The Court established a strict trimester-based
framework for state regulations of abortion, holding that government only has a
compelling interest in regulating abortion beginning in the second-trimester.
Thus, states could enact almost no restrictions on abortion during the firsttrimester; could enact restrictions necessary to protect maternal health in the
second-trimester; and could ban abortion entirely in the third trimester but must
make exceptions to protect maternal life and health.124 The Court defined
“health” broadly in terms of the health exception requirement.125
Despite this broad protection for the abortion right, Roe’s rhetoric
unfortunately did not evince much respect for women’s decision-making
capacity. Instead, the Court characterized the abortion decision as belonging
primarily to the physician rather than the patient.126 Nevertheless, under the
doctrinal regime laid out by Roe, later cases placed much more emphasis on

121. 410 U.S. 130 (1973).
122. Id. at 152–53 (citations omitted).
123. Id. at 169–71.
124. Id. at 163–165 (1973) (explaining the government’s interest in regulating each trimester of a
woman’s pregnancy).
125. Id. at 163 (providing examples of permissible state regulation to preserve and protect the
health of the mother after the first trimester). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973) (defining
health broadly to include “all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient”).
126. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165–66 (stating that the “decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment”). The Court’s rhetoric
repeatedly placed less emphasis on the woman’s interest in the decision and greater emphasis on the
physician’s involvement. See also id. at 153 (“All these factors [discussed above] the woman and her
responsible physician necessarily will consider in consultation.”). The Court did not address a socalled “informed consent” abortion law, but the Court stressed that abortion law should respect the
physician’s medical judgment in making the decision to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 163 (“[T]he
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the
State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”); See also id. at
164 (holding that until the end of the first trimester, “the abortion decision and its effectuation must
be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”); id. at 165–66 (stating
that this “decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to
his professional judgment”).
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women’s decisional autonomy in the abortion context.127 Most tellingly, in a
number of cases the Supreme Court struck down abortion-specific “informed
consent” laws that deviated from the general law of informed consent. These
precedents emphasized that women are equally entitled to make important
healthcare choices and, therefore, applied the law of informed consent with
equal force to women’s abortion decisions.128
The Supreme Court addressed abortion-specific “informed consent”
legislation in three cases after Roe. In each case, the Court used the general law
of informed consent as a yardstick to determine the constitutionality of abortionspecific “informed consent” laws. First, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,129 the
Court upheld a statute that required, among other restrictions, that a woman
certify in writing her consent to an abortion and “that her consent is informed
and freely given and is not the result of coercion.”130 The challenged statute did
not define any specific information that the physician must impart to the woman
prior to performing the procedure. The Court interpreted the requirement of
“informed consent” in the statute as simply following the general rule that the
physician should provide information to the patient “as to just what would be
done and as to its consequences.”131 Thus, although the Court upheld an
abortion-specific informed consent law, the Court interpreted the law to require
no more or less information than what physicians should be providing before
any medical procedure in accordance with the general principles of informed
consent.
Second, in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,132 the Court
struck down a number of abortion restrictions set forth in a city ordinance,
including an “informed consent” provision. The Court emphasized that the
validity of an abortion “informed consent” regulation “rest[s] on the State’s

127. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. ACOG, 476 U.S. 747, 759 (1986).
128. See Note, Abortion Regulation, supra note 84, at 702–11 (analyzing cases and concluding that
courts attempted to conform abortion “informed consent” legislation to the general law of informed
consent).
129. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
130. Id. at 65–66 (internal quotations omitted). The physicians challenging the legislation argued
that the requirement of written consent violated Roe and was unduly vague. The Court rejected these
arguments. “We could not say that a requirement imposed by the State that a prior written consent
for any surgery would be unconstitutional. As a consequence, we see no constitutional defect in
requiring it only for some types of surgery as, for example, an intracardiac procedure, or where the
surgical risk is elevated above a specified mortality level, or, for that matter, for abortions.” Id. at 67.
The Court noted that the state may have special concerns justifying ensuring that the decision to
abort is truly informed and consensual, since the “decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and
often a stressful one, and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its
nature and consequences.” Id. However, the Court also noted that the only other Missouri statutes
dealing with informed consent for general medical care related to persons committed to the Missouri
State chest hospital or to mental or correctional institutions. Id. at 66 n.6.
131. The Court rejected the physicians’ vagueness challenge to the word “informed,” stating that
“we are content to accept, as the meaning, the giving of information to the patient as to just what
would be done and as to its consequences. To ascribe more meaning than this might well confine the
attending physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his profession.”
Id. at n.8.
132. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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interest in protecting the health of the pregnant woman.”133 Although Danforth
had acknowledged that government has an interest in ensuring that the decision
to abort is well-informed, in Akron the Court emphasized that government does
not have the authority to determine the precise details of the information to be
conveyed, for two reasons. Initially, the Court stressed that the content of the
information to be provided to obtain consent “remains primarily the
responsibility of the physician.”134 Furthermore, the Court also emphasized that
the State’s interest in ensuring that consent to abortion is informed does not
permit the State to impose regulations “designed to influence the woman’s
informed choice between abortion and childbirth.”135
Applying this view, the Court struck down Akron’s abortion “informed
consent” ordinance, finding that the regulation was “designed not to inform the
woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether.”136 In
particular, the Court disapproved of the ordinance’s requirement that the
physician inform the patient that “the unborn child is a human life from the
moment of conception” and that the physician provide a detailed description of
“the anatomical and physiological characteristics of the particular unborn
child.”137 In addition, the ordinance required that the physician make a detailed
statement about the physical and emotional risks of abortion:
That abortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in serious
complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and prematurity in subsequent
pregnancies; and that abortion may leave essentially unaffected or may worsen
any existing psychological problems she may have, and can result in severe
emotional disturbances.138

The Court concluded that the first statement contradicted the holding in
Roe that a state may not adopt one theory of when life begins.139 The second
statement would require the physician to speculate too much about the
“characteristics of the particular unborn child.”140 Finally, the Court concluded
that the last statement “is a ‘parade of horribles intended to suggest that
abortion is a particularly dangerous procedure.”141
133. Id. at 443.
134. Id. at 443. The Court expressed concern with protecting the prerogatives of the physician:
“An additional, and equally decisive, objection to § 1870.06(B) is its intrusion upon the discretion of
the pregnant woman's physician. This provision specifies a litany of information that the physician
must recite to each woman regardless of whether in his judgment the information is relevant to her
personal decision. For example, even if the physician believes that some of the risks outlined in
subsection (5) are nonexistent for a particular patient, he remains obligated to describe them to her.
In Danforth, the Court warned against placing the physician in just such an ‘undesired and
uncomfortable straitjacket.’” Id. at 445.
135. Id. at 443–44.
136. Id. at 444–45.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 445, n.36.
139. Id. at 444.
140. Id. at 445.
141. Id. at 444–45. The Court did not object to requirements that the patient be informed of the
fact that she is pregnant; the gestational age of the fetus; the availability of information on birth
control and adoption; and the availability of assistance during pregnancy and after childbirth. In
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In the third case, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,142 the Court once again struck down an “informed consent”
abortion regulation that mandated delivery of seven specific kinds of
information to all abortion patients. The Court found that much of this
information would be irrelevant or inappropriate for some patients, such as
those with life-threatening pregnancies or pregnancies resulting from rape.143
The Court reaffirmed that a law requiring that “the woman give what is truly a
voluntary and informed consent, as a general proposition, is, of course, proper
and is surely not unconstitutional.”144 However, the Court reiterated that
government may not mandate the conveyance of biased information designed to
influence the woman’s choice against abortion.145 The Court described the
statute at issue as “nothing less than an outright attempt to wedge the
Commonwealth’s message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the
informed-consent dialogue between the woman and her physician.”146 The
Court opined that the sum of the challenged “informed consent” regulation “is,
or comes close to being, state medicine imposed upon the woman, not the
professional medical guidance she seeks, and it officially structures—as it
obviously was intended to do—the dialogue between the woman and her
physician.”147 Thornburgh recognized and rejected the State’s attempt, under “the
guise of informed consent,” to advance a coercive agenda contrary to the respect
for autonomous decision-making enshrined in informed consent law.148 As the
fact, the Court stated that such information is probably routinely given to patients where accurate, as
part of the routine informed consent process. Id. at 444–45. However, the Court nevertheless struck
these provisions down on the ground that this information could be given by a non-physician,
whereas the statute mandated that only a physician provide the information. Id. at 445 n.37.
Similarly, the Court had no objection to the requirement that the patient be informed of the
particular risks of her pregnancy and the abortion technique to be used, finding that this provision
properly left the precise nature of the “informed consent” disclosures “to the physician’s discretion
and ‘medical judgment.’” Id. at 447. The Court again struck down these requirements because the
ordinance mandated that only a physician provide this counseling. The Court held this requirement
unreasonable, since other qualified persons could perform the counseling adequately to ensure
maternal health. Id. at 447–49.
142. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
143. Id. at 763.
144. Id. at 760.
145. Id. (quoting City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443–44 (1983)).
The Court also reiterated its objection in Akron to the state’s intrusion on the informed consent
process, namely that “a rigid requirement that a specific body of information be given in all cases,
irrespective of the particular needs of the patient, intrudes upon the discretion of the pregnant
woman’s physician . . . .” Id. at 762. The Pennsylvania statutes at issue in Thornburgh prescribed in
detail the method for obtaining “informed consent.” For example, the statute required that the
patient be told by her physician the “fact that there may be detrimental physical and psychological
effects which are not accurately foreseeable.” Id. at 760–61
146. Id. at 762.
147. Id. at 763.
148. Id. The Court stated: “The mandated description of fetal characteristics at 2-week intervals,
no matter how objective, is plainly overinclusive. This is not medical information that is always
relevant to the woman's decision, and it may serve only to confuse and punish her and to heighten
her anxiety, contrary to accepted medical practice. Even the listing of agencies in the printed
Pennsylvania form presents serious problems; it contains names of agencies that well may be out of
step with the needs of the particular woman and thus places the physician in an awkward position
and infringes upon his or her professional responsibilities. Forcing the physician or counselor to
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Court aptly stated, “[t]his type of compelled information is the antithesis of
informed consent.”149
Lower federal courts similarly applied the general law of informed consent
in addressing abortion-specific “informed consent” regulations. One
commentator analyzing lower federal court cases under Roe demonstrated that,
in reviewing abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation, courts were
attempting to “align the informed consent to abortion prerequisite[s] with the
law of informed consent in general.”150 For example, in Margaret S. v. Edwards,151
the district court conducted a thorough review of the purposes of informed
consent in considering a challenge to a Louisiana “informed consent” to
abortion statute.152 The court concluded that informed consent “is designed to
foster patient knowledge about the risks and benefits of a particular
procedure.”153 The court upheld provisions it deemed consistent with the
purposes of informed consent, but struck down the provisions contrary to such
purposes, such as the requirement that the physician inform the patient that “the
unborn child is a human life from the moment of conception.”154
In sum, under the Roe regime, both the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts treated pregnant women as equally capable decision-makers by ensuring
that abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation conformed with the law of
informed consent as applied to all other patient decisions.155
As the composition of the Supreme Court shifted to the right, the Court
began signaling a more relaxed standard for judicial scrutiny of abortion

present the materials and the list to the woman makes him or her in effect an agent of the State in
treating the woman and places his or her imprimatur upon both the materials and the list.” Id.
Furthermore, the Court explained, “[t]he requirements of § 3205(a)(2)(i) and (ii) that the woman be
advised that medical assistance benefits may be available, and that the father is responsible for
financial assistance in the support of the child similarly are poorly disguised elements of
discouragement for the abortion decision. Much of this would be nonmedical information beyond
the physician's area of expertise and, for many patients, would be irrelevant and inappropriate. For a
patient with a life-threatening pregnancy, the ‘information’ in its very rendition may be cruel as well
as destructive of the physician-patient relationship. As any experienced social worker or other
counselor knows, theoretical financial responsibility often does not equate with fulfillment. And a
victim of rape should not have to hear gratuitous advice that an unidentified perpetrator is liable for
support if she continues the pregnancy to term.” Id.
149. Id. at 764.
150. Note, Abortion Regulation, supra note 84, at 704.
151. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 209 (internal quotations omitted). See also Note, Abortion Regulation, supra note 84, at
685 (noting that post Danforth, the lower federal courts uniformly struck down detailed abortion
“informed consent” statutes and stating that “[a]s with other medical procedures, the desirability of
acquiring consent to treatment only after full knowledge of its nature and consequences involves not
only the doctor’s fiduciary responsibility to the patient and the state’s interest in high medical
standards, but also the patient’s right to choose or refuse the proffered treatment.”).
155. See, e.g., id. at 702–11 (analyzing cases and stating that a review of “judicial scrutiny of the
informed consent to abortion statutes for invasions of the woman’s privacy right demonstrates that
the courts have upheld the requirements which coincide with the general law of informed consent
and have invalidated the portions which to not contribute to the goal of autonomous selfdetermination”).
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restrictions, which came to fruition in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.156 Casey
dramatically changed the landscape of abortion law and set forth the basic test
for abortion regulation that is still the law today, although Carhart made
significant changes to Casey’s rules.157 The Casey joint opinion rejected both the
trimester framework and the compelling state interest test set forth in Roe,158
instead declaring that the State had an interest from the outset of pregnancy in
protecting maternal health and the potential life of the fetus.159 Rather than
restrict the State’s ability to regulate abortion in the first two trimesters, Casey
drew the line at viability, holding that pre-viability abortion restrictions are
constitutional unless they amount to an “undue burden” on a woman’s right to
access abortion.160 Post-viability, the rule remained the same as in Roe—the State
is free to ban abortion entirely with exceptions to protect the health and life of
the woman.161 Casey defined the term “undue burden” as a government
regulation that has the “purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”162 Under this new
and notoriously vague test,163 Casey upheld all but one of a number of
restrictions on abortion.164 The Court struck down only the spousal notification
provision in the challenged statute.165 Many of the other restrictions at issue
were in fact reenactments of similar statutory provisions that the Supreme Court
had previously struck down under the rules established in Roe.166 In particular,

156. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The Court signaled its changing views most notably in Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989). The Webster decision was significant mainly for its
foreshadowing of a major shift in abortion law, which came to fruition in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
See Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 18
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 324–25 (2006).
157. See Casey A. Coyle, Comment, Gonzales v. Carhart: Justice Kennedy At The Intersection Of Life
Interests, Medical Practice And Government Regulations, 27 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 291, 297–307
(2008) (describing the evolution of abortion case law); Christopher Mirakian, Comment, Gonzales v.
Carhart: A New Paradigm For Abortion Legislation, 77 UMKC L. REV. 197, 201–205 (2008) (analyzing
noteworthy Supreme Court cases in the area of abortion regulation).
158. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869. The controlling opinion in Casey was an unusual joint opinion
coauthored by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.
159. Id. at 869 (“The woman’s liberty is not so unlimited, however, that from the outset the State
cannot show its concern for the life of the unborn.”).
160. Id. at 878–79.
161. Wharton et al., supra note 156, at 330–31 (noting that Casey “rebalanced the relative interests
of the state and the pregnant woman” and provided for significantly less constitutional protection of
abortion than Roe).
162. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
163. See Caitlin Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights after Casey and Carhart,
31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 675, 682–83 (2004) (discussing undue burden test and noting that joint opinion
“offered no method or standards by which to determine what constitutes a ‘substantial obstacle’”).
164. See Sandra Lynne Tholen & Lisa Baird, Con Law is as Con Law Does: A Survey of Planned
Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 971, 986 (1995) (describing
vagueness of undue burden test).
165. Casey, 505 U.S. at 893–94.
166. The challenged Pennsylvania statute required that: (1) physicians obtain their patients’
“informed consent” by reciting a state written script and then delaying their patients’ abortion
procedures for twenty-four hours; (2) married women notify their spouses of their decision to
terminate their pregnancies; (3) minors obtain parental consent; and (4) clinics maintain and submit
detailed reporting information. Id. at 877.
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Casey upheld the constitutionality of abortion-specific “informed consent”
statutes that were identical to the regulations struck down in Akron and
Thornburgh.167
Despite significantly reducing constitutional protection for abortion, Casey
claimed to preserve the “core” of Roe.168 It also offered a restatement of the
rationale for protecting a right to abortion. Roe relied heavily on the family
privacy line of cases in supporting the right to abortion and placed less
emphasis on the abortion right as an issue of bodily autonomy and gender
equality.169 Casey employed a different reasoning, one that still rested on
substantive due process, but also stressed the importance of gender equality and
bodily autonomy in protecting access to abortion.170 Casey’s doctrinal holdings
did not live up to its rhetoric; nevertheless its language concerning the
importance of abortion rights to women’s equality presents a striking contrast to
Carhart, as will be discussed in the next section.
Although Casey did not ground the abortion right in the Equal Protection
Clause, the opinion made repeated references to the impact of reproductive
rights on women and the effect of abortion restrictions on women’s ability to
achieve equality in society:
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that
ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot
alone be grounds for the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is
too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon its own
vision of the woman’s role, however dominant that vision has been in the course
of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a

167. Id. Contrary to precedents under Roe, Casey also upheld mandatory twenty-four hour
waiting periods, which typically are linked to “informed consent” provisions in abortion
regulations. Id.
168. Id. at 846 (“[T]he essential holding of Roe v. Wade should be retained and once again
reaffirmed.”).
169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 130, 165–66 (1973).
170. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846–47 (grounding the right to abortion in the Due Process Clause, but
emphasizing “liberty” as the controlling word from the Clause rather than “privacy”). See also id. at
849 (supporting substantive due process right by citing cases based on right to make “most basic
decisions about family and parenthood . . . as well as bodily integrity”). In discussing stare decisis as
a ground for upholding Roe, the Court explained that “Roe stands at an intersection of two lines of
decisions.” Id. at 857. First, the Roe opinion rested upon the line of decisions relating to privacy in the
family and “decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child,” in particular Griswold v.
Connecticut and its articulation of a right to access contraception. Id. Second, the joint opinion
declared that the right to access abortion “may be seen not only as an exemplar of Griswold liberty
but as a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal
affinity to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar
its rejection.” Id. See also id. at 896 (striking down spousal notification statute and emphasizing that
the “effect of state regulation on a woman’s protected liberty is doubly deserving of scrutiny . . . as
the State has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very bodily
integrity of the pregnant woman”). The Court thus explicitly linked the abortion right to the Court’s
other medical treatment cases, some of which specifically referenced informed consent law. Id.
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large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.171

The Court went on to state that “[t]he ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives.”172 Numerous scholars have noted the
shift in rhetoric from Roe’s emphasis on the physician’s interest in abortion
decision-making to Casey’s emphasis on women’s interest in abortion decisionmaking,173 rhetoric which starkly differs from that employed by the Court in
Carhart.174
Casey’s holdings failed to deliver on the promise of its rhetoric and to apply
the law consistently.175 Despite emphasizing gender equality, Casey’s reasoning
deviated from equal treatment principles, particularly in its analysis of
Pennsylvania’s abortion “informed consent” law. The general law of informed
consent protects patient autonomy by ensuring that patients receive the
necessary information to make their own decisions about medical treatment.
Obviously, patients cannot be self-determining if given information biased
towards one outcome. Yet, Casey permitted states to mandate information biased
against abortion under the guise of abortion-specific “informed consent”
legislation. Casey concluded that “the giving of truthful, nonmisleading
information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant health risks and
those of childbirth” did not amount to an undue burden.”176 At the same time,
Casey held that this state-mandated information need not be unbiased as to the
woman’s choice. The Court emphasized that it was:
Depart[ing] from the holdings of Akron I and Thornburgh to the extent that [it
now] permit[s] a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the
unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion.177

171. Id. at 852.
172. Id. at 856. The Court also emphasized, in discussing stare decisis, that: “An entire generation
has come of age free to assume Roe’s concept of liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in
society, and to make reproductive decisions.” Id. at 860. Casey’s rhetoric regarding women’s equality
starkly contrasts with Carhart’s portrayal of women. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 184 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77 (1995).
174. See infra Part III.C.
175. Many scholars have found it difficult to reconcile the opinion’s holdings as to the abortion
restrictions at issue with its grand language on the importance of reproductive rights to achieving
liberty and equality for women. See Martha A. Field, Abortion Law Today, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 3, 13–16
(1993); Gillian Metzger, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025 (1994); Wharton et al., supra note 156, at 335 (“[T]he joint
opinion has been widely criticized by commentators who have correctly noted the perplexing
inconsistency between its treatment of the spousal notification provision and most of the other
challenged provisions.”).
176. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
177. Id. at 883. The Court also placed significantly less weight on the second reason given by
Akron and Thornburgh for striking down “informed consent” laws, which was the interest of the
physician in preserving his or her medical judgment. “Whatever constitutional status the doctor-
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This rationale for upholding the “informed consent” law at issue
contradicts the underlying purposes of the doctrine of informed consent.178
Casey claimed to be supporting women’s fully informed, autonomous decisions,
but then allowed the government to use the “informed consent” process to
pressure women to choose childbirth over abortion. Casey’s reasoning in this
context also seems quite contradictory—if the abortion-specific “informed
consent” regulation must be “nonmisleading,” how can the Court permit the
regulation to be biased in one direction?
Not only did Casey permit information biased against abortion that would
pressure patients’ decisions under the misnomer of an “informed consent” law,
but also much of the Court’s rationale displayed little deference to women’s
equal capacity to make sound medical decisions. The Casey opinion assumed
that women lacked the judgment to make “mature and informed” abortion
decisions on their own, without pressure from the State, as other patients do
with respect to other important medical decisions. Statutes singling out abortion
for state-mandated information enforced by criminal sanction imply that
women patients cannot be trusted to elicit information from their physicians and
sue in malpractice if necessary, as is the norm.179 As Justice Stevens pointed out
patient relation may have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's
position. The doctor-patient relation does not underlie or override the two more general rights under
which the abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy. On its own, the doctor-patient relation here is entitled to the same solicitude it receives in
other contexts. Thus, a requirement that a doctor give a woman certain information as part of
obtaining her consent to an abortion is, for constitutional purposes, no different from a requirement
that a doctor give certain specific information about any medical procedure.” Id. at 884. The Court
also linked the “informed consent” provisions with the mandated waiting period: “The idea that
important decisions will be more informed and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection
does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important information
become part of the background of the decision.” Id. at 885.
178. Note, Abortion Regulation, 15 GA. L. REV. 681, 707 (“Detailed descriptions of the fetus’
physical appearance, development and sensory capacity, information about birth control and
provisions labeling abortion as major surgery with the possibility of severe, long term complications
are inconsistent with informed consent requirements in general because such information is
irrelevant to the decision whether to abort. Such details post no material risks to the woman, nor
does prevailing medical practice require such disclosure.”). See also Planned Parenthood League of
Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1021 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that the description of the fetus required
in state informed consent to abortion “presents no information whose essence most, if not all,
women do not understand before receiving it”); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v.
Ashcroft, 483 F. Supp. 679, 698 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (“It is . . . clear that many physicians believe that
there are no long-term physical or psychological effects of abortion or are unaware of such efforts.”);
Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp. 181, 210 (E.D. La. 1980) (“The evidence demonstrated, and the
Court so finds, that in the overwhelming number of cases, abortion is a minor surgical procedure, not
a major surgical procedure.”) (emphasis added); Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979);
Freiman v. Ashcroft, 584 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1978); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill 1978);
Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Note, Restrictions on
Women’s Right to Abortion: Informed Consent, Spousal Consent, and Recordkeeping Provisions, 5 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. RPTR. 35, 40 (1978) (“Women seeking abortions obviously wish to terminate their pregnancies
and already know that one result, in fact the desired result, of the procedure is termination of the
pregnancy.”).
179. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Physicians, Patients, and the Constitution: A Theoretical Analysis of
the Physician’s Role in “Private” Reproductive Decisions, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 183, 233 (1985) (“When the
state singles out abortion patients or female birth-control patients for special protection from their
physicians by mandating waiting periods and detailed disclosure requirements, the state
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in his separate opinion in Casey, the joint opinion “rests on outmoded and
unacceptable assumptions about the decision-making capacity of women.”180
For example, in upholding the constitutionality of the “informed consent”
provision, Casey stated: “Though the woman has a right to choose to terminate
or continue her pregnancy before viability, it does not at all follow that the State
is prohibited from taking steps to ensure that this choice is thoughtful and
informed.”181 Therefore, “[m]easures aimed at ensuring that a woman’s choice
contemplates the consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere with the
right recognized in Roe.”182 As Linda McClain stated, “it would appear that the
Court assumes that women who seek abortions do not understand what
abortion means with respect to a pregnancy.”183 McClain also noted,
“[e]nhancing deliberative autonomy would appear to be the joint opinion’s goal
only to the extent that those [J]ustices accept that women are choosing abortion
out of ignorance or without due attention to arguments against abortion.”184 A
number of scholars have also argued that abortion-specific “informed consent”
statutes inherently reflect sex discrimination, because they “fundamentally
perpetuate[] the stereotypical notion of the indecisiveness of women,
questioning a woman’s ability to make decisions about the course of her life . . .
[and reflect] stereotypical assumptions that women choose to obtain abortions
carelessly, without thinking through the implications of their decisions.”185
Casey marks a turning point where abortion law explicitly began treating
women as decision-makers less capable than other competent adults. It
permitted the State to impose biased information when women are choosing to
reject the traditional role of motherhood.186 Casey opened the door to so-called
perpetuates outmoded and pernicious stereotypes of women as indecisive and incompetent healthcare consumers, incapable of obtaining necessary information and time for reflection without
paternalistic government intervention.”).
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 918. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 872.
182. Id. at 873.
183. Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 143–44 (1992)
[hereinafter McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?] (“In particular, the piece of information the Court fears
the woman may lack is ‘the impact on the fetus,’ something the Court claims that ‘most women
considering an abortion would deem . . . relevant, if not dispositive to the decision.’ This remarkable,
if enigmatic, sentence stands without any cited support.”).
184. Id. at 142.
185. See David H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of
Sex Discrimination Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1902 (1995) (“The mandatory delay provision should
receive heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause because it reflects the assumption
that a woman’s proper role is to be a mother and that she must be required to rethink any decision to
forgo that role.”). See also Susan Frelich Appleton, supra note 179, at 231. (“[E]ven when [abortionspecific] laws do not limit access, they demean women by perpetuating stereotypes of women as a
special class of medical patients in need of governmental protection.”); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1035 (1984) (arguing that non-neutral, abortion-specific
legislation “reinforces the cultural stereotype that motherhood is women’s destiny . . . .express[es]
disapprobation for abortion, [and] regard[s] the woman as a ‘mother machine’).
186. See id. See also Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhetoric of
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 77, 78 (1995) (“The Court’s opinions have traditionally
reflected the view that women cannot make decisions about their pregnancy on their own.”);
Wharton et al., supra note 156, at 336 (“[I]n upholding the state-mandated counseling scripts as a
‘reasonable measure designed to ensure an informed choice,’ [the joint opinion authors] turned a
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“informed consent” laws in the abortion context that have deviated far from the
principles of the tort law doctrine of informed consent. In fact, although Casey
emphasized that only “truthful, nonmisleading” information should be
constitutionally permissible (even if designed to bias the woman’s decision
against choosing abortion), post-Casey decisions have permitted “informed
consent” statutes that are neither truthful nor factually non-misleading.187
Some have reasoned that although the general law of informed consent
would not permit physicians to impart information designed to pressure a
patient’s choice, there are different considerations at play as a constitutional
matter that could justify Casey’s holding.188 Casey specifically claimed that, under
its new “undue burden” test, the government need not be bound by informed
consent doctrine (which regulates physicians) with respect to governmental
regulation of abortion:
We also see no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform a woman
seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences
to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her

blind eye to the reality that both [the spousal notification] requirement and the mandatory waiting
period likewise rested on outmoded and unacceptable assumptions about the decision-making
capacity of women.”).
187. Approximately thirty two states have an abortion-specific law or policy related to informed
consent. In ten of these states, the law mandates similar information as is generally required in the
informed consent process. The laws in the remaining twenty two states go beyond the general
requirements of informed consent in various respects. Some statutes require abortion providers to
provide specific information verbally or to provide state written materials to the patient as part of
the informed consent process. This material may contain medically unsupported claims, information
that is medically irrelevant to the particular patient, or material that is inflammatory and expresses
moral rather than medical judgments. For example, South Dakota includes infertility without any
qualification as a risk of abortion, although medical evidence is to the contrary. See Rachel Benson
Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of Informed
Consent, GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., 11 (Fall 2007). Anti-abortion advocates have consistently pushed
the claim of a link between abortion and breast cancer. Although the National Cancer Institute
issued a statement categorically denying any link between induced abortion and an increase in
breast cancer risk after a through study of the scientific literature on the topic, six states include
medically inaccurate statements about abortion and breast cancer in their “informed consent”
literature. Some states also mandate information about fetal pain that is medically unsupported or
refer women to “crisis pregnancy centers” some of which falsely proclaim to provide abortion
“counseling.” See Chinue Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical
Accuracy of State-Developed Abortion Counseling Materials, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV, 13 (Fall 2006)
(noting how Carhart implicitly, and many state laws explicitly, “diverge from the principles of
informed consent”). Some states also mandate clinically unnecessary ultrasounds as part of the
abortion “informed consent” process. At least thirteen states have requirements related to
ultrasound. Id. at 10. See also Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724 (8th Cir. 2008)
(upholding South Dakota “informed consent” to abortion statute mandating that physicians inform
patients “that abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique living human being”);
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Science Research on
Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2008) (arguing that emotional information now
included in many state “informed consent” to abortion statutes burden women’s right to
autonomous decision-making because they are “calculated to bias a woman’s free choice, not inform
it”).
188. See, e.g., Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking Process,
4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787 (1996) (analyzing Casey under three alternative models by which the
state can structure the woman’s decisionmaking process).
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health . . . .[I]nformed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.189

Yet, Casey largely failed to explain why the government can impose
information biased towards childbirth and against abortion if its goal is truly
informed choice. The government acts disingenuously when it claims that
biased legislation serves to provide “informed consent” for women when in fact
the goal of abortion “informed consent” laws are to impose the government’s
normative views about what decisions women should make. Casey misused
“informed consent” terminology to further goals antithetical to the imperatives
animating informed consent law. Interestingly, Casey relied upon the same
woman-protective reasoning later used by Carhart as one of the primary
justifications for upholding biased “informed consent” legislation. Casey opined
that “informed consent” legislation, even if biased against abortion, would
benefit women’s mental health:
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of health. Nor
can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem the
impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to
ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State
furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an
abortion, only to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences,
that her decision was not fully informed.190

As in Carhart, the Court lacked any evidence to support its mental health
claim, but nevertheless invoked the rhetoric of informed consent (ensuring that
the woman’s decision is “fully informed”) to justify mandating biased
information that informed consent law would not tolerate.191 The seeds of the
woman-protective argument were planted in Casey and came to fruition in
Carhart.
C. “Informed Consent” and Abortion Decision-Making After Carhart
Although there is much to criticize in the Carhart decision, this section
focuses solely on the Court’s woman-protective rationale for restricting access to
abortion.192 This rationale invokes “informed consent” as a justification for a
decision that is antithetical to informed consent law. Informed consent law
rejects the notion that patients cannot balance the risks and benefits of medical
treatments and determine where their own best interests lie.193 In stark contrast
189. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992).
190. Id. at 882.
191. The Court did not have data to support this conclusion and studies at the time did not show
evidence that women suffered negative psychological consequences from abortion. See McClain, The
Poverty of Privacy?, supra note 183, at 142 (“Moreover, the Court makes no mention of evidence
before it suggesting that for the great majority of women, the primary reaction to abortion is relief, . .
. [and] there is no significant evidence of adverse psychological consequences resulting from
abortion, and that a decision to continue a pregnancy may have potential negative impacts upon the
life of a woman . . . .”).
192. See, e.g., Update: Phasing Out Abortion: One Step Closer to Terminating a Woman’s Constitutional
Right, in Gonzales v. Carhart, 24 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 597, 628 (2007) (discussing doctrinal shifts made
by Carhart).
193. See supra Part III.A (discussing general law of informed consent).
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to this notion, Carhart assumes that female patients (in particular pregnant
women) lack equal capacity to make judgments about their own well-being.
Although Carhart invokes informed decision-making as a reason for upholding
the federal abortion ban, the Court’s divergence from informed consent’s basic
principles exposes abortion law’s treatment of women as less trustworthy
decision-makers.
Casey established that an abortion regulation is unconstitutional if “its
purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”194 Purporting to address this
precedent, Carhart discussed the “purpose” behind the Act and set forth three
purposes justifying the ban on intact D&E, with one of the rationales being to
protect women from their own “regret.”195 In articulating the woman-protective
purpose for the Act, the Court incapacitated pregnant women as decisionmakers.
The Court began its explanation of how the ban on intact D&E can
“protect” women with the declaration: “Respect for human life finds an ultimate
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”196 This language
harkens back to the century old decision of Bradwell v. Illinois, in which women
were denied the right to practice law in part because “[t]he paramount destiny
and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and
mother.”197 The Carhart Court gave no explanation for why the mother-child
bond is the ultimate bond, as opposed to father-child or parental bonds,

194. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (emphasis added).
195. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 155–60 (2007). The Court also opined that the Act
“expresses respect for the dignity of human life” and preserves medical ethics. Id. at 157. A full
discussion of whether the Act may be justified by the State’s interest in protecting potential life or in
preserving medical ethics is beyond the scope of this article. Briefly, the Court posited that “[i]t is a
reasonable inference that a necessary effect of the regulation and the knowledge it conveys will be to
encourage some women to carry the infant to full term, thus reducing the absolute number of laterterm abortions.” Id. at 160. However, the Court did not further explicate how a ban on only one
method of abortion would reduce the overall number of second trimester abortions. See id. at 181
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that “the law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets
only a method of performing abortion”). Furthermore, it is rather ironic that the Court discussed
“protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession” as one of the purposes for the Act, but
failed to mention the ethical principle of informed consent as an integral component of medical
ethics. See Planned Parenthood v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that physicians
testified that being forced to use less safe procedures on patients to avoid criminal liability violated
ethical duties). It is unclear how the Court thought that the Act protects medical ethics. The Court
relied in part on the Congressional findings, which claimed that “partial-birth abortion . . . confuses
the medical, legal and ethical duties of physicians to preserve and promote life, as the physician acts
directly against the physical life of a child, whom he or she had just delivered, all but the head, out
of the womb, in order to end that life.” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157. However, anytime a physician
performs any method of abortion, he or she acts “against the physical life of a child.” Id.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that when the State “has a rational basis to act, and it does not
impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power to bar certain procedures and
substitute others, all in furtherance of its legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in
order to promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.” Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
196. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
197. 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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especially for a woman with an unwanted pregnancy.198 Rather, the Court
simply declared that the Act recognizes the supposedly “self-evident” reality of
women’s nature and role as mothers.199 The Court’s statement not only echoes
archaic notions of women’s proper roles, it also contradicts Casey’s reasoning
that the government cannot impose “its own vision of the woman’s role,
however dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our
culture.”200 Casey also spoke of the “bond of love” between a woman and her
child, but specifically noted that “[this] bond of love cannot alone be grounds for
the State to insist she make the sacrifice” of her bodily integrity and right to
equal citizenship.201 Following its statement about women’s “ultimate” role as
mothers, the Carhart Court declared: “While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”202 As
the Court acknowledged, it had no data to support its claim that women
“regret” their abortions.203 In fact, studies on the psychological impact of
abortion show that women generally do not regret decisions to terminate a
pregnancy.204
Relying on this unsupported claim of women’s regret, the Carhart Court
expressed concern that because the decision “[is] so fraught with emotional
consequence,” doctors “may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means
that will be used, confining themselves to the required statement of risks the
procedure entails.”205 The Court recognized that the law of informed consent
generally does not require disclosure of every detail of a particular medical
procedure and that “[a]ny number of patients facing imminent surgical
procedures would prefer not to hear all the details, lest the usual anxiety
preceding invasive medical procedures become the more intense.”206 However,
it was “precisely this lack of information concerning the way in which the fetus
will be killed that is of legitimate concern to the State.”207 The Court concluded:
198. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that Court failed to explain
why mother-child bond is the “ultimate” bond especially for an unwanted pregnancy or pregnancy
resulting from rape, and citing studies on prevalence of rape).
199. Id. at 159.
200. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852. See also Carhart, 550 U.S. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Though
today’s majority may regard women’s feelings on the matter as ‘self-evident,’ this Court has
repeatedly confirmed that ‘[t]he destiny of the woman must be shaped . . . on her own conception of
her spiritual imperatives and her place in society.’”).
201. Casey, 505 U.S. at 852.
202. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
203. Id. See also id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s woman-protective
reasoning is “an anti-abortion shibboleth for which [the Court] concededly has no reliable
evidence”).
204. See id. at 184 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing studies repudiating the claim that women
suffer psychological harm from abortion); BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE
ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION (2008) (reporting that meta-analysis of all available scientific
studies does not support link between an adult woman’s decision to have a single abortion and
mental health problems); Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 5, at n.44 (citing literature
repudiating notion of “post-abortion syndrome”).
205. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
206. Id.
207. Id.
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The State has an interest in ensuring so grave a choice is well-informed. It is selfevident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, only
after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce
the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child
assuming the human form.208

Even presuming that the Court correctly concluded that physicians should
provide detailed information on the available procedures to ensure a fully
informed choice for women, the obvious (although controversial) solution to a
problem of lack of information would be for government to mandate more
information, as Casey permits.209 Rather than requiring, for example, that doctors
disclose more details about the intact D&E procedure, the Court invoked the
rhetoric of informed consent (that women’s choices should be “well-informed”)
to justify banning a potentially safer medical procedure.210 The Court’s concern
for informed decision-making hardly seems genuine when its solution denies
decision-making altogether.
In addition, the Court’s “regret” rationale proves too much. Any medical
treatment decision can lead to regret in some percentage of patients. If
protection from regret were sufficient to permit government regulation,
government could override patient decision-making for any medical procedure,
eviscerating the legal and ethical norm of informed consent in healthcare. For
example, a recent study concluded that as many as one in five men who
undergo prostate surgery (which may not always be necessary to preserve life or
health) regret their decision, typically because of reduced sexual function.211
Taking Carhart’s reasoning to its logical extreme, why not permit the State to
protect men from the regret that may result from their reduced virility, which
may lead to depression and other psychological harms?212 Treatment for
prostate cancer can also be an emotionally fraught decision for men, particularly
208. Id.
209. See id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution the Court approves, then, is not to
require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their
attendant risks . . . . Instead, the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice,
even at the expense of their safety.”).
210. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 4–5 (arguing that, rather than uphold the ban, the Court could
have insisted on disclosures of all risks, but noting that this approach is controversial since it
imposes on the physician’s prerogative to determine what information is material for disclosure
under the law of informed consent).
211. Tara Parker-Pope, Regrets After Prostate Surgery, N.Y. TIMES, August 27, 2008, http://
well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/08/27/regrets-after-prostatesurgery/?scp=1&sq=Regrets%20After%20Prostate%20Surgery&st=cse. (stating that the finding that
men who were long past surgery experienced more regret, “likely speaks to the fact that as time
passes after surgery, men gain a more realistic view of lingering health and quality-of-life issues like
erection problems and other changes in their sex lives.”).
212. Prostate surgery for cancer treatment may not always be necessary to protect the patient’s
life or health—the benefits of treatment are in fact not certain for all patients. See Gerald L Andriole,
Robert L Grubb, Saundra S Buys, David Chia et al., Mortality Results from a Randomized ProstateCancer Screening Trial, 360(13) THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1310 (Boston: Mar 26, 2009); Gina
Kolata, Prostate Test Found to Save Few Lives, N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2009, at A1 (discussing the results
of two recent longitudinal studies of prostate screening); Fritz H Schröder, Jonas Hugosson,
Monique J Roobol, Teuvo L Tammela et al., Screening and Prostate-Cancer Mortality in a Randomized
European Study, 360(13) THE NEW ENGLAND J. OF MED. 1320 (Boston: Mar 26, 2009)
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due to possible sexual side effects. Yet, lawmakers do not respond to this proven
risk of regret by limiting men’s treatment options; rather lawmakers and
physicians work to ensure the provision of more accurate information to
improve men’s decision-making.213 Only in the case of the gender-specific
abortion decision does the law react to the possibility of patient regret—present
to some degree with any medical treatment—by permitting the government to
ban the treatment entirely and endanger the patient’s health.
Carhart’s justification for departing from the norm of informed consent is
admittedly not evidence-based, but rather based solely on sex-role stereotypes.
The Court parades as factual, “self-evident” description what is in fact a
normative view of the proper role of women.214 The woman-protective
reasoning portrays women who are “mothers” as too emotionally unstable to
make significant decisions and it treats pregnant women as “hysterical” and
childlike.215 Carhart also implies that women’s role as mothers mandates that
they sacrifice themselves for their fetuses or else they will become
psychologically unstable if they do not. It treats pregnant women who make
decisions judged to be contrary to their “ultimate” role as mothers as insane. As
Jack Balkin noted, Carhart basically claims that “[e]ither a woman is crazy when
she undergoes an abortion, or she will become crazy later on.”216
Relying on stereotypical assertions about women’s “emotional” nature and
their proper role as mothers, Carhart denies women’s ability to determine for
themselves what choices will protect their overall health.217 According to the
Court’s logic, a mentally competent woman is not capable of deciding how best
to protect her own mental health. The State is the final decision-maker, because
the State knows better than the woman herself that her “ultimate” role is as a
mother.218 In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg emphasized that the majority’s
reasoning “reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under

213. See Parker-Pope, supra note 211. The traditional legal and medical response to the inevitable
likelihood that some patients may regret their decision is generally to ensure that patients receive
more accurate information such that they can make better decisions for themselves. Id
214. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
215. See Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 5, at 1032–33 (arguing that the “womanprotective” anti-abortion argument portrays pregnant women like “the woman hysteric who figures
prominently in nineteenth-century antiabortion tracts”); Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (challenging the Court’s reliance on gender stereotypes, such as emphasizing “women’s
fragile emotional state” and the “bond of love the mother has for her child”).
216. Linda Greenhouse, Adjudging a Moral Harm to Women From Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, April 20,
2007 at A18 (reporting a comment on Balkinization blog by Professor Jack Balkin that calls Carhart’s
reasoning a “new paternalism”). See also Resnik, supra note 17, at 5 (“Carhart is a judicial foray into
psychology as well as religion, for the plurality opinion is an amalgam of presumptions about the
emotions and motivations of mothers and of doctors (fathers remain missing in action) interspersed
with moral or religious views about when life begins and what a pregnancy means for a woman.”).
217. Throughout the opinion, the majority refers to the woman seeking the abortion as a
“mother,” rather than as a “woman” or “patient.” The opinion also describes women largely in
terms of body parts or “anatomical landmarks,” rather than as moral agents making complicated
decisions. These and other rhetorical moves—such as referring to physicians as “abortion doctors”
and the fetus as “infant” or “unborn child”—signal important shifts in the Court’s view of abortion
rights. See generally Carhart, 550 U.S. 124.
218. Id. at 159.
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the Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”219 Constitutional
scholar Reva Siegel has also extensively demonstrated that this twisted
“informed consent” paradigm—that abortion should be banned to protect
women from their own poor decisions—relies on gender-stereotyped notions of
women’s capacity and women’s roles long rejected under equal protection
jurisprudence.220
Carhart’s reasoning also runs directly contrary to general principles of
informed consent that treat competent adults as capable decision-makers.
Adults make important emotional medical decisions that may lead to regret in
many situations, such as the prostate cancer treatment example discussed above,
but the law does not interfere with those decisions on the ground that someone
other than the patient knows better what life choices will lead to mentally
healthy consequences. To the contrary, informed consent law ensures that even
physicians, the presumed experts on medical treatment, do not interfere with
patients’ decisions. The law defers to patients by mandating that physicians
provide sufficient information to the patient so that the patient can ultimately
make her own decision whether to accept or reject treatment.221 Although
invoking notions of informed consent, the woman-protective anti-abortion
reasoning turns on its head informed consent law’s respect for patient decisionmaking capacity.
Carhart’s use (and misuse) of informed consent rhetoric exposes abortion
law’s anomalous treatment of women as healthcare decision-makers.222 The
Court’s woman-protective reasoning claims to follow the general principle of
protecting patients’ interests in informed decision-making, but applies that
principle differently to pregnant women seeking abortion. Contrary to the
Court’s assertion, there are in fact sound reasons a woman might choose the
banned intact D&E procedure. Foremost, there are safety benefits to the intact
version of the procedure. Three separate trial courts and three appellate courts
accepted the expert testimony of physicians who explained why an intact D&E
219. Id. at 185 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Ginsburg’s stinging dissent also stressed that challenges
to abortion restrictions “do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of privacy,” but rather
“center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature.” Id.
220. See Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 8, at 991–93, 1034 (arguing that the
“woman-protective” anti-abortion argument’s claims “about the competence of women as decisional
agents taps perniciously (or, depending on one’s standpoint, fortuitously) into longstanding
traditions of gender paternalism, increasing the likelihood that lawmakers will make judgments
about regulating women’s decision making that rest on stereotypical assumptions about women”);
Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective
Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1688 (2008) (discussing Carhart’s use of “womanprotective” anti-abortion claim and noting that the “claim is that by restricting all women,
government can free women to be the mothers they naturally are]”) [hereinafter Siegel, The Right’s
Reasons].
221. See supra Part III.A.
222. Several other commentators have noted that the Court’s reasoning in Carhart runs directly
counter to the principles enshrined in the doctrine of informed consent and criticized the rationale
from a bioethical perspective. See Dresser, supra note 6, at 14; Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard
to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abortion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1599, 1620–21 (2008); Rachel
Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the Fundamental Principles of
Informed Consent, GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV., 6–13 (Fall 2007).
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procedure would be the safest method of abortion for some women.223 If the
State can require a woman to undergo a riskier abortion procedure in order to
“protect” her from regret at the method of abortion, why not allow the State to
ban all D&E abortions? Under the Court’s reasoning, the State could argue that
if women knew the details of the non-intact D&E procedure, which the Court
acknowledged could be characterized as equally “brutal,”224 women would
similarly regret such a decision. If all the State must do to satisfy the
Constitution is allow some alternative but less safe method of abortion, why not
permit the State to ban D&E entirely and force women to undergo induction
abortions? Induction abortion involves inducing labor, which entails more
health risks to the patient, is significantly more costly as it requires a hospital
stay, and is far more emotionally and physically painful for the woman.225 Given
women’s supposed lack of decision-making capacity due to their emotional
nature and their proper role as mothers, the State could readily argue that
women should only have access to induction abortion since this method appears
arguably less gruesome and, perhaps, more “natural” as it simulates the birth
process. Yet, contrary to the Court’s description of women’s “self-evident”
nature (that no woman would knowingly choose the intact D&E method of
abortion), studies show that when given the option of either induction abortion
or D&E, many women choose D&E.226 Of course, some percentage of women

223. Intact D&E limits the number of times a physician must insert instruments into the uterus,
which reduces the risk of uterine perforation. Intact D&E may also decrease the likelihood of
retained tissue, which could cause infection, hemorrhage, and infertility. Intact D&E may take less
operating time than “standard” D&E, and therefore may reduce bleeding, the risk of infection and
the risk of complications relating to anesthesia. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 161. See also Carhart v. Ashcroft,
331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 923–29 (D. Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir.
2005), rev’d, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. 2d 436, 470–
74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp. 2d 957, 982–83 (N.D.
Cal. 2004). Some providers feel that all late second-trimester abortions are more safely completed by
intact D&E, although this conclusion was disputed by the government’s expert witnesses. One study
comparing the D&E procedure and the intact variant concluded that both were safe, although there
was not sufficient data to conclude whether or in what instances intact D&E would be safer for the
patient. Chasen, supra note 29, at 1180–83. After the Act was signed into law in 2003, at least one
physician called for further study on the procedures to determine the safety benefits. See Manuel
Porto, A Call for an Evidence-Based Evaluation of Late Midtrimester Abortion, 190 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1175, 1175–76 (2004). Of course, after the Court upheld the Act, no such studies will be
possible in the United States. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 133 (concluding that the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act of 2003 should be upheld).
224. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
225. See Chasen et al., supra note 29, at 1161–64 (finding that D&E is safer than induction and that
most women prefer D&E to induction abortion); Amy M. Autry et al., A Comparison of Medical
Induction and Dilation and Evacuation for Second-Trimester Abortion, 187 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 393, 393–97 (2002) (finding that induction methods of abortion are riskier in the
second-trimester).
226. Chasen et al., supra note 29, at 1163. It’s interesting to note that in Roe v. Wade, the Court
stated that historically one of the state’s concerns in criminalizing abortion was to protect women
from the physical harm that was likely to result due to unsafe abortion techniques: “Thus, it has been
argued that a State’s real concern in enacting a criminal abortion law was to protect the pregnant
woman, that is, to restrain her from submitting to a procedure that placed her life in serious
jeopardy.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973). The Court explained that since abortion techniques
were now safe, the state could no longer justify criminalizing abortion on the ground of protecting
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may regret having an abortion, but rather than seriously engage with the
question of how to ensure better decision-making for pregnant women, Carhart’s
approach takes the decision away entirely.227
The Court’s adoption of the woman-protective anti-abortion claim has
already had an impact on abortion law and policy, particularly with respect to
abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation. For example, relying on
Carhart’s woman-protective rationale, the Eighth Circuit recently upheld an
extremely biased South Dakota “informed consent” to abortion statute, which
among other requirements mandates that physicians inform their patients that
abortion will terminate the life of a “whole, separate, unique living human
being; that the pregnant woman has an existing relationship with that unborn
human being . . . [and] that by having an abortion, her existing relationship and
her existing constitutional rights with regards to that relationship will be
terminated.”228 The misuse of “informed consent” terminology in abortion law
is also likely to encourage more malpractice actions against abortion providers
for failure to fully inform patients of the “scientific and medical fact that [the
fetus is] a complete, separate, unique and irreplaceable human being.”229 Efforts
to mandate clinically unnecessary ultrasounds under the guise of “informed
consent” to abortion have also been spurred on by Carhart’s woman-protective
rationale, even though mandatory ultrasounds impose a medical procedure on a
patient in violation of the right to refuse treatment protected by informed
consent law.230 Each of these legal approaches claims to act on behalf of women
women’s health. Id. Carhart attempts to make a similar public health argument, except on the
unsupported claim that abortion is bad for women’s mental health. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159.
227. See Tracy A. Weitz, et al., You Say “Regret” and I Say “Relief”: A Need to Break the Polemic
About Abortion, 78 CONTRACEPTION 87, 88 (2008) (critiquing “regret” rationale for restricting abortion
and arguing for recognition of “full range of feelings women have about abortion” and renewed
focus on research and policy measures supporting women’s autonomous decision-making regarding
abortion and childbirth). See also Reva Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra note 220, at 145 (criticizing
woman-protective anti-abortion argument for failure to actually address concerns about emotional
harm resulting from abortion and instead offering “a one-size-fits-all cure for the many social
circumstances that lead women to end a pregnancy”); Susan Frelich Appleton, Toward a “Culturally
Cliterate” Family Law?, 23 BERKELEY J. OF GENDER, L. & JUSTICE 267, 333–34 (2008) (noting that shift to
focus on women’s decision-making in abortion should “permit a more nuanced inspection of a
variety of constraints on women’s agency that prompt abortion decisions and other choices” rather
than paternalistic responses to ban abortion for women’s own “protection”).
228. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726 (8th Cir. 2008). See also Matthew
Gordon, State Attempts to Expand Abortion Informed Consent requirements: New Life After Gonzales v.
Carhart?, 35 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 751, 753 (2007) (reviewing significant doctrinal changes made by
Carhart in reducing judicial scrutiny of abortion restrictions and arguing that “Carhart may
ultimately spur expansions of informed consent requirements that go even farther in promoting a
state’s view of when life begins”).
229. See Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418 (N.J. 2007) (discussing complaint of plaintiff Rose
Acuna who sued her abortion provider for his failure to obtain her informed consent prior to
abortion). See also Maya Manian, Privatizing Bans on Abortion: Eviscerating Constitutional Rights
Through Tort Remedies, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 123 (2007) (discussing use of tort law to undermine
constitutional right to abortion).
230. See Nova Health Systems v. Henry, District Court of Oklahoma, No. CJ-2008-9119, 2008 WL
4874107 (Okl. Dist. Oct. 9, 2008) (trial court petition challenging Oklahoma’s mandatory ultrasound
law, which requires an ultrasound prior to all abortions and verbal description of the image but also
excuses doctors from liability for withholding information from the pregnant woman about the fetus
such as existence of severe developmental defects). See also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing:
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and to care about ensuring their well-informed decision-making, but on closer
analysis operate as “harassment masquerading as knowledge.”231
Carhart’s woman-protective rationale ignores the lessons learned long ago
within the law of informed consent—primarily that “it is the prerogative of the
patient . . . to determine for [her]self the direction in which [her] interests seem
to lie.”232 As Rebecca Dresser has argued, the debate over abortion “should focus
on the basic substantive issue—whether the value of developing human life
justifies depriving women of the choice to have an abortion,” not disingenuous
arguments about protecting women’s psychological well-being.233 Carhart’s true
goal appears to be thwarting abortions and enforcing normative views of
motherhood, not protecting women’s health.234 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg
articulated this point best: “Eliminating or reducing women’s reproductive
choices is manifestly not a means of protecting them.”235
IV. THE STATE AND THE PATIENT: SOME EXCEPTIONS TO PATIENT AUTONOMY
Carhart’s woman-protective reasoning is not only antithetical to informed
consent law’s deference to patient decision-making, but also finds no support in
constitutional law precedent on medical treatment decisions. The womanprotective anti-abortion rationale’s striking departure from both informed
consent law properly understood and from public law precedents on medical
care exposes abortion law’s sex discriminatory treatment of women as
healthcare decision-makers. Although informed consent doctrine primarily
governs the patient-physician relationship, it is a common law rule that has
provided guidance to the Court’s understanding of the constitutional rights of
patients vis-à-vis the State. As scholars have noted, there is quite a bit of
convergence between the principles underlying the tort law doctrine of

Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 351, 360 (2008) (arguing
that mandatory ultrasound requirements “disrupts the law’s traditional respect for privacy, bodily
integrity, and decisional autonomy in matters of such intimacy as reproduction, pregnancy, and
family formation”).
231. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 230, at 360.
232. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (1972).
233. Dresser, supra note 6, at 14. Dresser criticizes both the Court’s reasoning in Carhart and
biased abortion-specific “informed consent” legislation such as in South Dakota, arguing that “it is
disingenuous to portray abortion bans and mandatory disclosures of one-sided and inaccurate
information as policies protecting women.” Id.
234. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 191 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that true
purpose of the Act and Court’s defense of it is to chip away at abortion rights). See also Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding federal regulation prohibiting Title X clinics from
disseminating any information about abortion). Carhart claims to care about giving women full
information about abortion, but Rust is another example of the Court denying information about
abortion altogether, here by gagging the physician. See id. at 213–14 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Court’s decision and stating, “In addressing the family-planning needs of their clients,
the physicians and counselors who staff Title X projects seek to provide them with the full range of
information and options regarding their health and reproductive freedom. Indeed, the legitimate
expectations of the patient and the ethical responsibilities of the medical profession demand no
less.”).
235. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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informed consent and the constitutional right of privacy.236 Both doctrines
ultimately reflect concern for protecting individual autonomy, although this
concern may at times be balanced against contrary societal interests in health or
safety. In the limited instances where the government has overridden patient
medical treatment choices, the government has not done so on the ground that
the State knows better than individual patients what kinds of treatment they
might regret. In no other context besides abortion does the law deny a
competent adult patient’s right to give her informed consent to a medical
treatment that is proven to be safe, and possibly safer than other available
treatments, based on the government’s unsubstantiated belief that the treatment
will be psychologically harmful to the patient.
Justice Kennedy noted in Carhart that the government heavily regulates the
medical profession to protect public health and safety.237 For example, state
governments directly regulate the medical profession through licensing schemes
and scope of practice laws. These laws regulate who can practice medicine and
have been upheld by the Supreme Court.238 However, although states license
physicians and enforce scope of practice laws that regulate who can practice
medicine, the government generally does not dictate how physicians practice
medicine or what procedures they should use for any particular treatment.239
Similarly, although the government indirectly regulates physicians’ practice of
medicine through tort law and medical malpractice claims, the standards for
liability for medical malpractice are generally set by professional standards of
care, not state fiat.240 Decisions about how to proceed with medical care are
ultimately preserved for the patient, as reflected in the background rule of
informed consent. Thus, while Carhart correctly notes that government has
played a significant role in regulating the medical profession,241 historically this
regulation has also served to protect patient autonomy through laws such as
informed consent.242
The Supreme Court has only permitted the government to ban access to
medical treatments in certain narrow instances, generally to protect the public

236. “Upon analysis it is evidence that both informed consent law and the constitutional right of
privacy arose to protect the same interest, the right of autonomous self-determination, and that both
are subject to the same qualification, the community’s and family’s interest in the health and wellbeing of their members.” Note, Abortion Regulation, supra note 84, at 701. See also Meisel, The
“Exceptions” to the Informed Consent Doctrine, supra note 80, at 431 n.70 (stating that “the ‘presumption
of individual self-determination’ is the common-law analog of the constitutional right of privacy”).
237. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157.
238. See Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912) (upholding Texas licensing requirement for
practitioners of medicine).
239. See George J. Annas, Medical Judgment in Court and in Congress: Abortion, Refusing Treatment,
and Drug Regulation, 34 HUM. RTS. 2 (2007) (discussing the amount of deference physicians have been
given in certain situations). There are some limitations on how physicians practice medicine, such as
use of experimental drugs, discussed infra Part IV.B.1.
240. See id. at 3.
241. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157.
242. See supra Part III.A (discussing law of informed consent).
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health.243 In fact, Carhart’s woman-protective reasoning—that it is self-evident
that abortion would damage women’s psychological health—invokes the public
health paradigm for government regulation of patient decision-making in order
to justify the federal abortion ban.244 Carhart’s woman-protective reasoning
claims that Congress banned intact D&E for the legitimate purpose of protecting
maternal health. Justice Kennedy’s opinion attempts to frame the federal
abortion ban as a public health issue, and suggest that, like the Court’s other
public health cases, the Court should leave it to the legislature to determine
what is in the public’s best interests.245 Carhart opines that it appropriately leaves
to Congress the determination of which treatments are medically necessary to
preserve pregnant women’s health, just as the Court has left healthcare decisionmaking to legislatures with regard to compulsory vaccinations, drug
regulations, and physician assisted suicide.246
Yet, a close examination of these cases reveals that the woman-protective
rationale adopted in Carhart is readily distinguishable from precedent allowing
government restrictions on medical treatment. There are four general areas
where the Supreme Court has allocated decision-making power to the State
rather than the patient: (1) compulsory vaccination laws; (2) bans on controlled
substances; (3) regulation of experimental drugs; and (4) bans on physician
assisted suicide.247 These precedents, many of which Carhart relies upon, do not
support its reasoning not only because of the lack of reliable evidence regarding
alleged detrimental psychological consequences to abortion, but also because
none of these precedents permit the government to ban a medical treatment
proven to be physically safer based on the government’s unproven view that the
treatment will be psychologically harmful to the patient. In other words, in no
243. See Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 15 at 344 (categorizing the Supreme Court’s
medical treatment decision cases as falling under either an “Autonomy Model” or “Public Health
Model”).
244. Id. at 320 (arguing that Carhart’s “reasoning and language often resembled the analytic
structure of the public-health line of cases”).
245. See id. at 320; Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163 (citing, in support of lack of health exception, Lambert
v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 597 (1926) and Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 179 U.S. 11, 30–31 (1905)).
246. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 164 (“Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of
legislative power in the abortion context any more than it does in other contexts.”).
247. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (upholding bans on physician assisted
suicide); United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979) (addressing regulation of experimental
drugs); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926) (upholding ban on alcohol even for medical uses);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding compulsory vaccination law). The Court
also upheld compulsory sterilization in the infamous case of Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
However, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), essentially overruled Buck by
upholding a fundamental right to refuse government mandated sterilization. See id. at 542.
Therefore, government mandated sterilization is not discussed here. Several other cases cited by
Carhart as support for permitting judicial deference to the government on matters of medical or
scientific uncertainty are not discussed here because they address rights of criminal defendants, not
medical decision-making. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 360, n. 3 (1997) (upholding civil
commitment of persons convicted of sexually violent offenses); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,
364–365, n.13, 370 (1983) (upholding civil commitment of persons acquitted of criminal offense by
reason of insanity); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427 (1974) (upholding denial of access to
optional federal treatment program to convicted criminal under rational basis review). It is
nonetheless disturbing that Carhart compares pregnant women seeking abortion to convicted
criminals in stating that these precedents support its decision. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163–64.
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other context does the law ban a medically necessary treatment on the ground
that the State knows better than a mentally competent adult what will be best
for her mental health. That kind of paternalism only applies to women seeking
an abortion.
These public health precedents can be boiled down into a few simple
principles for when and why the government can restrict patients’ medical
options or deny patient capacity for decision-making. Restrictions on a
competent adult patient’s right to informed consent are justified when the State
intervenes to protect third parties other than the competent adult patient—the
justification being that the State may intervene “for the common good.”248 The
State can intervene on the patient’s own behalf only where there is a lack of
information about the medical treatment such that the informed consent process
cannot be expected to function properly and there is a risk of physical harm to
the patient—the justification being that the State can then intervene “for the
patient’s own good.”249 Neither of these rationales supports Carhart’s reasoning
that the State can trump a woman’s right to consent to a physically safer medical
procedure, where full information is available, in order to protect her from
unsubstantiated psychological harm resulting from her supposedly incompetent
decision-making.
To summarize the argument below, the Supreme Court has held that the
government can mandate vaccinations and ban controlled substances in order to
protect third parties from communicable diseases and from recreational, that is,
non-medical, drug abuse.250 Further, the government can protect patients from
their own poor decision-making only in cases where there exists such a lack of
information that the informed consent process cannot be expected to function
appropriately and there is a risk of serious physical harm to the patient—the
primary justification given by the federal courts for permitting government
regulation of experimental drugs.251 Finally, the Supreme Court’s justifications
for permitting state bans on physician assisted suicide meaningfully differ from
Carhart’s woman-protective rationale in several ways. Primarily, the Court
reasoned that states could criminalize physician assisted suicide in order to
protect vulnerable patients from coercion in end-of-life decision-making—that
is, to protect the life of patients who are in fact not mentally competent or not
making fully informed and voluntary decisions.252 In contrast, Carhart holds that
the government can endanger the health of competent women patients, making
voluntary choices, where there is no lack of information, in order to protect them
from a speculative risk of regret.
It is important to carefully review and distinguish the Supreme Court’s
precedents on the constitutionality of government bans on medical treatments,
248. See infra Part IV.A. Of course, one could argue that fetuses are “third parties” that the State
is protecting by banning intact D&E. Although the Court’s medical treatment cases suggest that
government can impose health risks on individual patients for the protection of other persons and
thus the public health at large, never before has the Court suggested that government can impose
health risks on women in order to preserve the potential life of the fetus. See infra Part IV.A.2.
249. See infra Part IV.B.
250. See infra Part IV.A.
251. See infra Part IV.B.1.
252. See infra Part IV.B.2; Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732–33.
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because Justice Kennedy cites case law from each of these areas as if they
directly support Carhart’s reasoning.253 Moreover, demonstrating that the
woman-protective anti-abortion rationale in fact finds no support in existing
precedent further bolsters the claim that abortion law discriminates against
women, because it permits the State to treat pregnant women as having lesser
decision-making capacity (and therefore needing more “protection”) than other
patients making similarly important medical decisions.
A. Exceptions to Patient Autonomy “For the Common Good”
The easiest public health precedents to distinguish from Carhart’s womanprotective rationale are those cases in which the Supreme Court permitted the
government to deny patient choice “for the common good” rather than based on
a paternalistic “for the patient’s own good” rationale. That is, the government
may deny patient choice in order to protect third parties from collateral harm—
the paradigmatic public health case.254 The Court has relied upon the “for the
common good” rationale to justify compulsory vaccination laws and regulations
of controlled substances. Carhart’s reliance on these precedents in support of its
decision also represents a move towards establishing the fetus as a third-party
“person” with interests sufficient to trump the woman’s right to preserve her
own health.
1. Compulsory Vaccination
Although patients generally have a right to refuse medical treatment, one
glaring exception to this general rule is the law on compulsory vaccination.255 In
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held that the government could
override an individual’s right to refuse medical treatment through mandatory
vaccination laws.256 In response to fears about the spread of smallpox, a
Massachusetts local board of health adopted a regulation requiring that “all the
inhabitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March
1st, 1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated.”257 Massachusetts law permitted local
boards of health to “require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all
the inhabitants” and to “provide them with the means of free vaccination.”258
Notably, the regulation provided for a health exception for children “who
present[ed] a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are unfit
subjects for vaccination.”259 The compulsory vaccination law at issue had no
health exception for adults and those who refused vaccination were subject to a
fine of five dollars.260

253. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007).
254. See generally LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW 20 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2000).
255. See Kristine M. Severyn, Jacobson v. Massachusetts: Impact on Informed Consent and Vaccine
Policy, 5 J. PHARMACY & L. 249, 255 (1995) (arguing that compulsory vaccination laws violate
informed consent).
256. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
257. Id. at 13.
258. Id. at 12.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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Jacobson refused to be vaccinated under the regulation, and as a result was
prosecuted and fined.261 Jacobson asserted that he had suffered adverse health
consequences as a result of previous vaccination and had witnessed a similar
adverse reaction in his son as well.262 In his argument to the Supreme Court,
Jacobson asserted that compulsory vaccination violated his right to control his
body and to preserve his health. He claimed that compulsory vaccination is
“hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and
health in such way as to him seems best.”263 Although this case came before the
Supreme Court in 1905, before the doctrine of informed consent was wellestablished, Jacobson’s argument fit squarely within the common law rule
affirming a patient’s right to refuse medical treatment. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that patients have a common law right to refuse medical
treatment, but held that compulsory vaccination was justified by the
government’s interest in protecting third parties from the spread of disease. In
justifying its denial of patient autonomy in this manner, the Court noted that
society imposes “manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject
for the common good.”264 The Court particularly emphasized the State’s interest in
protecting the public health: “Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount
necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of
disease which threatens the safety of its members.”265 Discussing the reasons
behind the law, the Court emphasized evidence that smallpox was in fact a
threat in certain parts of Massachusetts. The Court worried that disallowing
compulsory vaccinations “would practically strip the legislative department of
its function to care for the public health and the public safety when endangered
by epidemics of disease.”266 Vaccination can only operate successfully as a
public health measure if it avoids the “free rider” problem. One scholar explains
the rationale for compulsory vaccination as follows:
Vaccination is effective as a public health measure only when it is universally
applied. Compulsion was therefore upheld in order to protect everyone and to
prevent a few from attempting to get a ‘free ride’ by obtaining the benefit of
vaccinated neighbors without taking the risk themselves. The calculus of
authority in such cases involves patient-citizen and state rather than patientsubject and physician; the decision to proceed despite the individual’s
unwillingness is grounded on the superior collective good, not on the
superiority of medical judgment.267

All fifty states and the District of Columbia today cite Jacobson as the key
legal precedent for compulsory vaccinations laws. Jacobson still stands as the
paradigmatic public health case because although it did arguably impose a
health risk on the plaintiff,268 it did so not on the ground of protecting his own
261. Id. at 22.
262. Id. at 36.
263. Id. at 26.
264. Id. (emphasis added).
265. Id. at 27.
266. Id. at 37.
267. Capron, supra note 106, at 399.
268. Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 15, at 297 (noting that Jacobson presented strong
evidence of the health risks of vaccination).
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health or doubting his ability to make decisions about his own healthcare, but to
protect other people. 269 For example, in denying Jacobson’s right to refuse
vaccination, the Court could have argued that he should be subject to
compulsory vaccination because the State knows better than Jacobson how to
protect individual health from infectious diseases and vaccination would be in
Jacobson’s own best health interests. In its analysis, the Court did emphasize the
vast amount of medical and other expert opinion concluding that vaccination is
the best method for prevention of communicable diseases. Yet, the Court did not
impose vaccination for Jacobson’s own sake, but for the sake of the greater
community. Since the government must mandate vaccination for all to ensure
that vaccination works effectively, the Court found that the State was justified in
trumping an individual patient’s healthcare decisions in order to protect third
parties.270
It is important to note that I am not suggesting that compulsory vaccination
laws should not include health exceptions for adults as well as children. In fact,
all vaccination laws today do include a health exemption.271 Even in Jacobson, the
Court suggested that there may be cases where a health exception to
compulsory vaccination would be constitutionally necessary for adults, such as
when it “can be shown with reasonable certainty that [the individual] is not at
the time a fit subject of vaccination or that vaccination, by reason of his then
condition, would seriously impair his health, or probably cause his death.”272
From the language of the opinion, the Court appears to be suggesting that there
are limits to the health risks the State can impose even for the public good.
Where there is evidence that government regulation will cause serious harm to
health, Jacobson seems to be saying that the Constitution may require a health
exception, yet Carhart denied women such an exception.273
Furthermore, the justification for compulsory vaccination laws differs
materially from Carhart’s woman-protective rationale. In contrast to Jacobson,
Carhart’s woman-protective reasoning justifies imposing health risks on women
patients not for the protection of others, but supposedly for their own good
because they lack the judgment to make sound healthcare decisions on their
own.274 The woman-protective anti-abortion argument claims that the
government can endanger women’s health by denying them the opportunity to
consent to a particular form of treatment in order to protect them from regret
and “depression and loss of esteem.”275 Jacobson and the compulsory vaccination
269. Statutes on mandatory vaccinations generally apply to children entering schools, and in
some states to children entering licensed daycare facilities. States may also mandate vaccination for
adult students entering college. See Severyn, supra note 255, at 249.
270. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (upholding the State's vaccination law, which was “adopted in
execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health and the public safety, confessedly
endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease”).
271. Today “[e]very state provides a medical exemption, i.e., a physician certifies in writing that
the vaccine(s) may be harmful, or are contraindicated.” Severyn, supra note 255, at 260
272. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39.
273. Id.
274. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to
abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”).
275. Id.
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laws that followed from it do not support Carhart’s paternalistic treatment of
women’s medical decision-making.
2. Controlled Substances
Although government regulation of medical practice is largely left to the
states, the federal government has asserted broad authority to regulate drugs
related to medical treatment pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In a number of
instances, patients have asserted a constitutional right to access banned drugs
for medical purposes, but the Supreme Court has upheld the federal
government’s right to regulate controlled substances—recreational drugs—
against the wishes of individuals seeking those substances for purely medical
purposes. 276 Similarly to Jacobson, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have articulated a “for the common good” rationale for allowing the State to
limit patient access to controlled substances even for medically necessary
treatment—not because the State knows better what is good for the patient but
rather that the State must enforce drug laws primarily for the protection of third
parties. The Court has held that the government has the power to ban controlled
substances, even where patients have asserted a health need for a particular
drug, with respect to two separate issues: bans on alcohol during Prohibition
and the current federal ban on medical marijuana.277
One of the first cases to address the medical need for a controlled substance
was Lambert v. Yellowley, 278 to which Justice Kennedy in Carhart specifically
refers in support of his conclusion that the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban
need not include a health exception.279 Samuel Lambert was a distinguished
New York physician who challenged a Prohibition era law that limited the
amount of “spirituous” liquors he could prescribe to his patients for medicinal
purposes.280 The National Prohibition Act, enacted pursuant to the Eighteenth
Amendment, limited the amount of liquor physicians could lawfully prescribe
to “[n]ot more than a pint of spirituous liquor to be taken internally . . . by the
same person within any period of ten days
. . . .”281 Lambert brought suit to enjoin Edward Yellowley, the acting
federal Prohibition director, from interfering with his ability to prescribe these
“medications” as he thought necessary in his professional medical judgment to
protect his patients’ health. In other words, Lambert argued for a health

276. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop.
(OCBC), 532 U.S. 483 (2001); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581 (1926).
277. Raich, 545 U.S. at 1 (2005) (addressing Congress’ Commerce Clause power to ban medical
marijuana); Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC), 532 U.S. at 483 (2001) (addressing statutory issue
with regard to federal ban on medical marijuana); Lambert, 272 U.S. at 581 (1926) (addressing medical
need for alcohol during Prohibition).
278. 272 U.S. 581 (1926). See also James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545 (1924) (holding
that Congress could allow the sale of certain alcohols but not others for medicinal use during
prohibition).
279. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 163.
280. Lambert, 272 U.S. at 588.
281. Id. at 587. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited the “manufacture, sale, and
transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes” and granted Congress the “power to
enforce prohibition by appropriate legislation.” Id. at 589.
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exception to Prohibition.282 Lambert lost in the Second Circuit and, on appeal to
the Supreme Court, argued that the provision was unconstitutional “because it
ha[d] no real or substantial relation to the appropriate enforcement of the
Eighteenth Amendment” and thereby violated his fundamental rights as a
physician.283
Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the Court, holding that the
Eighteenth Amendment gave the federal government the power to enact and
enforce the challenged legislation. The Court noted that although medical
opinion differed, Congress considered evidence that the “preponderating
opinion” was against the use of liquor for medicinal purposes.284 The Court
emphasized that Congress could ban medicinal alcohol because it had evidence
of the potential for alcohol abuse by persons other than the patient, as well as
the difficulty of regulating illegitimate uses of the drug. For example, “[a]mong
those [physicians] who prescribe them there are some who are disposed to give
prescriptions where the real purpose is to divert the liquor to beverage uses.”285
This concern parallels similar concerns expressed in the more recent medical
marijuana cases discussed below.
Lambert granted the government the authority to ban a medical treatment
that some physicians believed necessary for their patients’ health, but for
reasons quite different than the women’s “regret” rationale presented by
Carhart. Lambert denied access to medicinal liquors, but not on the ground that it
served the patient’s own good because patients lack the ability to understand
the risks of such treatment. Like in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, which Lambert
relied upon, the Court rested its decision on the ground that Congress could act
for the common good of others as reflected in the Eighteenth Amendment.286
Primarily, the Court opined that Congress could act to limit the amount of
liquor prescriptions because of the “difficulties always attendant upon the
suppression of traffic in intoxicating liquors.”287 The Court repeatedly
emphasized that Congress had the power to address the “liquor problem” by
“keeping the quantity that may be prescribed within limits which will minimize
the temptation to resort to prescriptions as pretexts for obtaining liquor for
beverage uses.”288 Thus, the Court justified denying a potentially medically

282. Id. at 588.
283. Id. at 589. The Court did not address whether patients possessed a constitutional right to a
health exception. Id.
284. Id. at 590.
285. Id. In his dissent, Justice Sutherland argued that, given that the challenged act implicitly
concedes liquor to be of medicinal value, Congress could not limit prescription to an inadequate
quantity. Sutherland asserted that the effect of upholding the legislation at issue was “to deprive the
states of the exclusive power, which the Eighteenth Amendment has not destroyed, of controlling
medical practice and transfer it in part to Congress.” Id. at 604 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
286. Id. at 595–97.
287. Id. at 594.
288. Id. at 596. The Court also stressed that in limiting alcohol for medical treatment, Congress
could consider “the lessons of half a century of experience in the several States in dealing with the
liquor problem.” Id. at 589. See also Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 561 (1924) (upholding
challenge to federal prohibition on prescription of malt liquor and noting difficulties of enforcing
bans on alcohol if permitted for medicinal purposes since a prescription “opens many doors to
clandestine traffic”).
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necessary treatment based on the government interest in protecting third parties
from alcohol abuse.
Very similar rationales are implicit in the Supreme Court’s treatment of
challenges to government restrictions on access to medical marijuana. The
Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether patients have a fundamental
constitutional right to access medical marijuana in order to protect their health
or life; however, it has considered other issues related to medical marijuana that
at least provide a hint of justification for allowing the government to ban
medical marijuana despite medical need. The Court considered the issue of
medical marijuana in two separate challenges: Oakland Cannabis Buyers’
Cooperative (OCBC”) v. United States289 and Gonzales v. Raich.290 In OCBC, the
Court addressed only the statutory question of whether the Controlled
Substances Act should be interpreted to incorporate a medical necessity defense.
In Raich, the Court considered only the question of whether the federal
government had the power pursuant to the Commerce Clause to ban locally
grown and consumed marijuana. In both cases, the Court tangentially discussed
the issue of patient need for medical marijuana. Its rationale for allowing the
government to ban medical marijuana despite medical need, as in Lambert,
appears to be one of protecting the common good by preventing non-medical
use and abuse of recreational drugs by third parties.291
In OCBC, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that medical
necessity is a defense under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).292 The CSA
prohibits the “manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including
marijuana.”293 In OCBC, a marijuana cooperative that distributed medical
marijuana to patients with physician-certified need argued that “because
necessity was a defense at common law, medical necessity should be read into
the Controlled Substances Act.”294 OCBC contended that marijuana was the only
drug that could alleviate its patients’ severe pain and other debilitating
symptoms.295 The district court recognized that “human suffering” could result
from the federal ban on medical marijuana, but denied OCBC’s request to allow
it a common law medical necessity defense to federal seizure of its property.296
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, and held that medical necessity is a cognizable
defense under the Controlled Substances Act.297 The federal government
obtained immediate Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.
The Supreme Court rejected OCBC’s argument on the ground that the
common law defense of necessity cannot be applied to a statute where the
289. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop. (OCBC), 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
290. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
291. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 490; Raich, 545 U.S. at 33.
292. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 490.
293. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 486. See also Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2007).
294. OCBC, 532 U.S. at 490.
295. Id. at 487.
296. Id. at 488.
297. The Ninth Circuit then remanded to the district court for reconsideration of whether a
medical necessity exemption should be granted to OCBC. Id. at 488. Following remand, the district
court incorporated a medical necessity defense into its injunction prohibiting OCBC from possessing
or distributing marijuana in violation of federal law. Id. at 488 n.2.
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legislature had already made its own determination against incorporating such
a defense.298 The Court noted that federal law “reflects a determination that
marijuana has no medical benefits worthy of an exception.”299 Marijuana is a
Schedule I drug under the Controlled Substances Act, and the Attorney General
can only include a drug in Schedule I under three conditions: (1) the drug “has
no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States”; (2) has “a
high potential for abuse”; and (3) has “a lack of accepted safety for use . . . under
medical supervision.”300 Furthermore, the Court stated in dicta that no medical
necessity defense exists under the statute not only for manufacturing and
distributing medical marijuana as OCBC did, but also for other restrictions such
as mere possession, “even when the patient is ‘seriously ill’ and lacks alternative
avenues for relief.”301 Three Justices concurred in the judgment, specifically
limiting their conclusion to the holding that manufacturers and distributors of
marijuana could not raise the medical necessity defense.302 The concurring
Justices suggested that medical necessity may be a defense for seriously ill
patients with no other treatment alternatives who possess and use marijuana
solely out of medical necessity, but no such plaintiffs were before the Court.303
The Court limited its review to the statutory question and did not address any
constitutional arguments regarding a patient’s fundamental right to access
medically necessary treatment.304 The Court stated that it had granted review
“[b]ecause the decision raises significant questions as to the ability of the United
States to enforce the Nation’s drug laws.”305 At least implicitly, OCBC suggests
that the federal government can deny a health exception to bans on medical
marijuana in order to ensure proper enforcement of the CSA and thereby protect
public health by preventing recreational use of the drug. This rationale for
permitting the government to ban medical marijuana became more apparent in
the Court’s next case addressing the issue.
In Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court held that the federal ban on locally
grown and consumed medical marijuana was within Congress’ power pursuant
to the Commerce Clause.306 In upholding Congress’ power to apply the CSA
even to those patients with desperate medical need, the Court emphasized
Congress’ concerns with controlling the market in illicit drugs. The Court
explained Congress’ main objectives in enacting the CSA: “to conquer drug
298. Id. at 490–94.
299. See id. at 491 (stating that “for purposes of the Controlled Substances Act, marijuana has ‘no
currently accepted medical use’ at all. § 811.”).
300. Id. at 492 (quoting Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2007)).
301. Id. at 495 n.7.
302. Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 501 (“[W]hether the defense might be available to a seriously ill patient for whom
there is no alternative means of avoiding starvation or extraordinary suffering is a difficult issue that
is not presented here.”).
304. The Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative asserted that, if the statute were not read to
include an implied medical necessity defense, the statute would violate the substantive due process
rights of patients and offend the fundamental liberties of the people under the Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Amendments. Id. at 494. The Court found that it need not address the underlying
constitutional issues, because the Court of Appeals had not addressed those claims. Id.
305. Id. at 489.
306. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled
substances.”307 In particular, the Court stressed that “Congress was particularly
concerned with the need to prevent the diversion of drugs from legitimate to
illicit channels.”308
Raich did not reach the question of whether patients have a substantive due
process right to access medical marijuana, although the patients had raised that
claim in the lower courts.309 Angel Raich and her fellow patients presented
significant evidence that the government ban on this particular medical
treatment imposed health risks and suffering on patients.310 However, in
contrast to Carhart, the Court did not question the capacity of the patients
themselves to render informed decisions about the use of marijuana for medical
treatment. Instead, the Court emphasized that the purpose behind the CSA,
including its application to medical marijuana, was to conquer recreational drug
abuse through the orderly enforcement of drug laws.311 The Court relied heavily
on “[t]he congressional judgment that an exemption for such a significant
segment of the total market would undermine the orderly enforcement of the
entire regulatory scheme
. . . .”312 Like in Jacobson and Lambert, the Court permitted the government
to sacrifice some individuals’ health for the sake of “the common good”—
protecting third party non-patients from the negative effects of recreational drug
abuse. Of course, one could characterize bans on recreational drug use as
paternalistic as well, but that presents a different issue than the law’s treatment
of patients’ capacity for medical decision-making in order to preserve their own
health. Again, it is important to note that I am not arguing that the rationales put
forth by the legislature and the courts are a sufficient or valid justification for
denying a health exception for medical marijuana. Rather, the key point here is
that denying a health exception based on protecting third parties “for the
common good” does not justify Carhart’s woman-protective rationale, which
incapacitates pregnant women for purely paternalistic reasons.
In sum, pursuant to these precedents on compulsory vaccination and bans
on controlled substances, the government can deny patient exemptions from or
access to certain medical treatments, even if a health exception may be medically
necessary, but only to protect other persons and not because of paternalistic
doubt about the capacity of patients to make informed treatment decisions.
Whether or not one agrees with compulsory vaccination or total bans on
307. Id. at 12.
308. Id. at 12–13.
309. Id. at 33 (stating that the Court would not reach the patients’ substantive due process and
medical necessity claims). The patients challenging the government action alleged that enforcing the
CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, and the doctrine of medical necessity. Id. at 8.
310. Id. at 28 n.37 (noting that plaintiffs presented strong evidence of medical uses for marijuana,
which “would case serious doubt on the accuracy of the findings that require marijuana to be listed
in Schedule I,” but nevertheless, Congress could regulate because “most of the substances classified
in the CSA ‘have a useful and legitimate medical purpose’ . . . even if respondents are correct that
marijuana does have accepted medical uses” the CSA can impose limits beyond what California
wants to allow).
311. Id. at 28.
312. Id. at 1, 28.
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medically necessary alcohol or marijuana, these cases do not provide support for
the denial of a health exception to the ban on intact D&E. These precedents do
not treat competent adult patients as incompetent medical decision-makers in
need of government “protection.”
More broadly, Carhart’s suggestion that the Jacobson and Lambert line of
cases support its imposition of health risks on pregnant women seeking abortion
represents a move towards treating the fetus as a person. Jacobson and the rest of
the public health line of cases permit governmental denial of medically
necessary treatment in order to protect existing members of the public—
government can choose to force some persons to risk their health for the
protection of other persons. To suggest that government can deny a health
exception to an abortion regulation by analogy to Jacobson and Lambert positions
the fetus as a third party with status equal to the pregnant woman. Carhart
implies that, just as the government can choose to protect third persons from
alcohol abuse by forcing patients with medical need for alcohol to sacrifice their
health needs, the government can choose to protect the fetus by forcing the
pregnant woman to jeopardize her health. Until Carhart, the Court had always
required a health exception to abortion restrictions, even for post-viability
abortions.313 In fact, abortion is the only medical treatment for which the Court
has articulated a constitutional right of access.314 At least in part, this is because
the fetus has not been given status as a constitutional person such that the State
could be justified in impinging on the medical needs of women. If Carhart holds
that fetuses are third parties that the government can choose to protect as a
“public health” matter, that would logically lead to a justification for denying
the abortion right altogether.
B. Exceptions to Patient Autonomy “For the Patient’s Own Good”
The more difficult medical decision-making precedents to differentiate
from Carhart’s woman-protective rationale are the ones that, like Carhart, offer
the paternalistic, “this is for the patient’s own good” reasoning for government
limits on patient choice in medical care. Two examples of paternalistic limits on
patient decision-making are government regulation of experimental drugs and
bans on physician assisted suicide. This section argues that neither of these
precedents supports abortion law’s woman-protective justification for abortion
restrictions.
1. Experimental Drugs
The federal government’s broad authority to regulate interstate commerce
in drugs includes the regulation of pharmaceuticals as well as controlled
substances. The federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) regulates

313. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
314. See Hill, A Tale of Two Doctrines, supra note 15, at 315 (arguing that outside the context of
abortion courts have not explicitly recognized a constitutional right to choose appropriate medical
treatment); Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for
Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (2007) (arguing for right of medical self-defense, i.e., a constitutional
right to access medically necessary treatments).
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drug manufacturing, marketing and distribution.315 The FDCA bars the
introduction of “new drugs” into interstate commerce until the drug has been
administratively approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for
both safety and efficacy based on sufficient scientific evidence.316 The statute
defines a “new drug” as “[a]ny drug . . . not generally recognized among experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the safety and
effectiveness of drugs as safe and effective for use under the conditions
prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof.”317
In a number of cases, patients have asserted a right to access experimental
drugs not yet approved by the FDA.318 The Supreme Court has not addressed
whether the Constitution protects a right of access to medications needed for the
preservation of health or life; however, the Court has considered statutory
challenges to the ban on access to experimental drugs, in which it discussed
justifications for the government’s regulation of new drugs.319 A number of
lower federal courts have addressed the question of whether the Constitution
provides an affirmative right of access to particular medical treatments (outside
the context of abortion) and all have rejected such a right.320 The federal courts
have justified permitting government regulation of experimental drugs on the
rationale that regulation protects patients from making poor decisions.
Although this rationale is paternalistic,321 courts have supported their position
on the ground that physicians and patients lack basic information about
experimental drugs, which undermines the possibility of using the informed
consent model of patient decision-making in this context, and that regulation is
necessary to protect patients from serious physical harm.322
315. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–397 (2007).
316. Specifically, the statute provides that “[n]o person shall introduce or deliver for introduction
into interstate commerce any new drug” without approval by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA). 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2007).
317. 21 U.S.C. § 321(p) (2007).
318. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 710 & n.18 (2007) (summarizing cases).
319. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 552 (1979) (noting that legislative history
suggests that new drug safety and effectiveness standards were intended for persons suffering from
both curable diseases as well as fatal illnesses).
320. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 710 & n.18 (2007) (en banc) (summarizing cases rejecting the claim that patients have a
constitutional right to obtain a particular type of treatment or to obtain treatment from a particular
provider where the government has reasonably prohibited the type of treatment or provider). See,
e.g., Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993); N.Y. State Ophthalmologic Soc’y v. Bowen,
854 F.2d 1379, 1389 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Carnohan v. United States, 616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980);
Rutherford v. United States, 616 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1980), on remand, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). See also
Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 645 n.10 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v. Burzynski
Cancer Research Inst., 819 F.2d 1301, 1313–14 (5th Cir. 1987); Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 588
(1926); Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (“There is perhaps no profession more properly
open to such regulation [concerning public health] than that which embraces the practitioners of
medicine.”).
321. See Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Drug Treatments for HIV and AIDS: A Contractarian Model,
11 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 419 (1994) (“The FDA traditionally has taken a paternalistic approach to the
control of drug access, focusing almost exclusively on protecting patients from exposure to
dangerous or ineffective forms of treatment.”).
322. See, e.g., United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
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For example, in United States v. Rutherford the Supreme Court denied
terminally ill cancer patients the right to access an experimental drug, although
solely on statutory grounds.323 In 1975, a group of patients and their spouses
brought suit against the federal government to enjoin interference with access to
Laetrile, an experimental cancer drug that was not approved for distribution
under the FDCA.324 The district court ultimately held that “by denying cancer
patients the right to use a nontoxic substance in connection with their personal
health, the Commissioner had infringed [upon] constitutionally protected
privacy interests.”325 The Tenth Circuit refused to address the constitutional
issue, and instead concluded that the requirements of safety and effectiveness in
the FDCA had no application to terminally ill cancer patients.326
The Supreme Court rejected the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the FDCA.
Instead, the Court emphasized that even individuals suffering from a fatal
illness “should be shielded from fraudulent cures.”327 To support its conclusion,
the Court relied on legislative history suggesting that Congress intended to
include experimental drugs for the treatment of life-threatening diseases within
the ambit of the statute. The Court also deferred to FDA policy, which “never
made exception for drugs used by the terminally ill.”328 The Court opined that
safety and effectiveness remain relevant concerns for cancer patients, because “it
is often impossible to identify a patient as terminally ill except in retrospect.”329
The Court also expressed fears of a slippery slope to deregulation of dangerous
experimental drugs, noting that to accept the patients’ argument “that the safety
and efficacy standards of the Act have no relevance for terminal patients is to
deny the Commissioner’s authority over all drugs, however toxic or ineffectual,
for such individuals.”330 Most relevant here, the Court worried that if a “new
market” in experimental drugs for terminally ill patients were opened up, those
patients would soon be exploited by the pharmaceutical industry:
Since the turn of the century, resourceful entrepreneurs have advertised a wide
variety of purportedly simple and painless cures for cancer, including liniments
of turpentine, mustard, oil, eggs, and ammonia; peat moss; arrangements of

323. 442 U.S. 544 (1979).
324. Id. at 548. The suit was originally filed by a cancer patient and her husband, but after the
patient’s death and an amended complaint, the district court certified a class of terminally ill cancer
patients as plaintiffs. Id. at 549 n.4. The district court ordered the government to permit limited
purchase of Laetrile after finding that in proper dosages the drug was nontoxic and effective. The
Tenth Circuit did not modify the injunction, but ordered remand to the FDA for a determination of
whether Laetrile qualified as a “new drug” under the statute. The Tenth Circuit also ordered the
FDA to determine whether Laetrile was exempt from premarketing approval under two
“grandfather clauses” in the controlling statute. Id. at 549. The Commissioner of the FDA found that
Laetrile qualified as a “new drug” and concluded that there was insufficient evidence of its safety or
effectiveness. Id. The Act does not define what constitutes recognition of a drug’s safety and
effectiveness, but in previous case law the Supreme Court has interpreted the FDCA as requiring
“expert consensus” on safety and effectiveness founded upon “substantial evidence.” Id. at 549 n.7.
325. Id. at 550.
326. Id. at 550–51.
327. Id. at 552.
328. Id. at 553.
329. Id. at 556.
330. Id. at 557–58.
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colored floodlamps; pastes made from glycerin and limburger cheese; mineral
tablets; and “Fountain of Youth” mixtures of spices, oil, and suet . . . . [T]his
historical experience does suggest why Congress could reasonably have
determined to protect the terminally ill, no less than other patients, from the
vast range of self-styled panaceas that inventive minds can devise.331

This statement expresses the heart of the federal courts’ justification for the
federal government’s extensive regulation of “new drugs.”332 Critics often
characterize this rationale as paternalistic, because it disparages patients’ ability
to make their own healthcare decisions, including by choosing to take on the
risks of unproven medications. Some might argue that Rutherford provides
support for the notion in Carhart that government can paternalistically make
decisions on patients’ behalf to protect them from their own ignorance and poor
judgment.333
Yet, the federal courts’ rationale for upholding limits on access to
experimental drugs rests primarily on the lack of information about those drugs,
such that the usual process of informed consent cannot be expected to function
properly. The government must step in as information gatherer and decisionmaker because patients cannot otherwise obtain the information on the risks and
benefits of novel drugs on their own. For example, recently in Abigail Alliance for
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach,334 the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals further articulated the reasons for denying patients’ right to give
“informed consent” to experimental drugs. Abigail Alliance represented a group
of terminally ill patients who supported expanded access to experimental drugs,
and asserted a constitutional right to make “informed decisions” about these
drugs—that is, to take on the risks of trying experimental drugs that were their
only hope of a cure.335 As noted above, the FDCA generally prohibits access to
new drugs until approved by the FDA, which can be a time-consuming
process,336 but the FDA has some regulations to permit “fast-tracking” of
experimental drugs for terminally or severely ill patients.337 The Alliance argued
that these programs were inadequate and submitted a petition, which the FDA
rejected, arguing that the FDA should promulgate new regulations allowing
“sponsors to market experimental drugs, under some circumstances, after the
completion of Phase I trials.”338
331. Id. at 558.
332. Id. Rutherford did not address whether patients have a fundamental right grounded in
substantive due process to access potentially life-saving medications. Cf. Carnohan v. United States,
616 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating in dicta that “rights of privacy and personal liberty do not
give individuals the right to obtain [the cancer drug] Laetrile free of the lawful exercise of
government police power”).
333. The Carhart Court implies that the “abortionist,” like the pharmaceutical industry, will
exploit women by withholding information the Court views as relevant. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550
U.S. 124, 184 (2007). Certainly the anti-abortion movement has framed the issue in this manner,
characterizing women as passive victims to evil abortionists. See Siegel, The Right’s Reasons, supra
note 220, at 1643.
334. 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
335. Id. at 697.
336. Id. at 698 (explaining FDA’s four phase process).
337. Id. at n.4.
338. Id. at 699.
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Initially, a panel of the D. C. Circuit held that the patients in Abigail Alliance
had properly asserted a constitutional claim based on a due process liberty
interest. The court framed the right as one of “access to potentially life-saving
post-Phase I investigational new drugs on behalf of mentally competent,
terminally ill adult patients who have no alternative government-approved
treatment options.”339 The panel emphasized that, unlike in Rutherford, the
patients in Abigail Alliance sought access to drugs that had cleared FDA’s Phase I
safety hurdle.340 Phase I clinical human trials test first for safety in order to
authorize further testing on a “substantial number of human beings.”341 The
panel emphasized that the Alliance was not asserting “an unfettered right of
access to all new or investigational new drugs . . . [and] also does not challenge
the Controlled Substances Act. . . .”342 Rather, the right encompassed only “the
right of terminally ill patients to make an informed decision that may prolong
life . . . acting on a doctor’s advice, to obtain potentially life-saving medication
when no alternative treatment approved by the government is available.”343
An en banc D.C. Circuit reversed the panel’s decision.344 In rejecting the
Alliance’s argument, the court emphasized that the Alliance sought access to
medications “that have not yet been proven safe.”345 The Alliance argued that
the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence supported its asserted right,
specifically relying upon the right recognized in Roe and Casey that a woman
may obtain an abortion “at any stage of a pregnancy if doing so is necessary to
preserve her life or health.”346 The court rejected this analogy, opining that
unlike in abortion, the Alliance’s case “is about whether there is a constitutional
right to assume, in the Alliance’s own words, ‘enormous risks,’ in pursuit of
potentially life-saving drugs.”347 The court also found it “highly significant” that
the Supreme Court, although never directly addressing the constitutional claim
of a due process right of access to experimental drugs, had rejected similar

339. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d 472
(D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d en banc, 495 F.3d 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
340. Id. at 486 (distinguishing Rutherford because in that case patients sought access to “a new
cancer drug that had not cleared FDA’s Phase I safety hurdle and thus had not been approved for
expanded testing on humans in ongoing clinical trials”).
341. Id. at 477.
342. See id. at 478.
343. Id. at 477–78 (emphasis added).
344. Notably, the court stated that it only addressed the right as framed by the Alliance, which
was “the right of a terminally ill patient with no remaining treatment options to decide, in
consultation with his or her own doctor, whether to seek access to investigational medications that
the [FDA] concedes are safe and promising enough for substantial human testing.” The court
specifically did not address “the broader question of whether access to medicine might ever
implicate fundamental rights.” Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710.
345. Id. at 703. The en banc court noted that “[t]he fact that a drug has emerged from Phase I with
a determination that it is safe for limited clinical testing in a controlled and closely monitored
environment after detailed scrutiny of each trial participant does not mean that a drug is safe for use
beyond supervised trials.” Id. at 706.
346. Id. at 709 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) and citing Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (reaffirming the life and health exceptions)).
347. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 710.
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challenges to the FDCA and FDA regulations on statutory grounds in
Rutherford.348
After rejecting the Alliance’s assertion of a fundamental right, the court
applied the rational basis test to determine whether the FDA regulations should
stand. Relevant to the concerns here, the court articulated its justification for
preventing terminally ill patients from taking on informed risks with respect to
novel medications. It noted that the “Alliance would rather that individual
patients make decisions about this risk than have the FDA decide which drugs
are safe enough for limited access to the terminally ill.”349 However, the court
was persuaded by the FDA’s contrary claim that “‘patients could be exposed to
unreasonable risks from investigational drugs that may be neither safe nor
effective.”350 The court reasoned that the government has “a rational basis for
ensuring that there is a scientifically and medically acceptable level of
knowledge about the risks and benefits of such a drug.”351 In particular, it relied
heavily on the FDA’s argument regarding informed consent: “With so little data
available, it is hard to understand how a patient could be truly informed about
the risks—or potential benefits—associated with the drug.”352 The court
emphasized its agreement with the FDA that “‘it does not serve patients well to
make drugs too widely available before there is a reasonable assessment of such
risks to guide patient decisions, and experience in managing them.’”353
In other words, the courts reject the general rule protecting patients’ right
to informed consent with regard to experimental drugs, because an information
gap exists about new drugs that the informed consent process cannot address.
Patients lack the capability to make the same quality of informed decisions
about novel medications because of scientific complexity, lack of expertise and,
obviously, lack of full information since the drug remains experimental. Where
there is such an information gap, the informed consent process cannot serve its
purposes of allowing patients to weigh the risks and benefits of treatment
options on their own.354 Although the federal government’s extensive regulation
of novel medical drugs and devices is paternalistic, lack of information presents
a strong argument for rejecting the informed consent paradigm of patient
decision-making in this context.355 Furthermore, numerous scholars have argued
348. Id. at 710 (citing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 28 (1979); United States v. Rutherford, 442
U.S. 544, 552 (1979); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001)).
349. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 712.
350. Id. at 712. The court held that the FDA’s reasoning met the rational basis test, a conclusion
“compelled by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Rutherford.” Id.
351. Id. at 713. In justifying its conclusion, the court cited both Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 30 (1905), and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–63 (2007). Id.
352. Id. at 700.
353. Id.
354. The dissenting judge from the panel opinion argued that “the majority attempts to limit its
new right to a patient who is ‘mentally competent’ and has ‘informed access’ to experimental drugs .
. . [but] [t]he majority never explains what mental competence, in this context, would require.”
Abigail Alliance, 445 F.3d at 496 (Griffith, J., dissenting).
355. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription Drugs and
Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 929–30
(1996); Peter Jacobson & Wendy Parmet, A New Era of Unapproved Drugs: The Case of Abigail Alliance
v. Von Eschenbach, 297 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 205, 206–07 (2007).
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that the denial of access to experimental drugs is primarily justified by “the for
common good” rationale, i.e., protecting third parties, since FDA regulation
creates needed incentives for the drug trials that lead to evidence of safety and
effectiveness of new drugs and thereby serves the public health at large.356
Whether one agrees or disagrees with the FDA’s regulation of new drugs,
however, the federal courts’ rationale for permitting government restrictions on
patient choice in this context differs significantly from the anti-abortion womanprotective rationale articulated in Carhart, for at least two reasons. First, bans on
“partial-birth” abortion bar access to a medically necessary treatment that
medical evidence has already proven to be safe and effective, and in fact may be
the safest procedure in some cases.357 With regard to intact D&E, there is no
information gap on safety and effectiveness that requires government
intervention.358 In fact, “partial-birth” abortion bans increase the risk of harm to
women by criminalizing a medical procedure that medical experts believe to be
safer than other alternatives for some patients. Carhart permits the government
to impose physical health risks for a non-novel medical treatment in order to
supposedly protect patients from an unproven risk of regret or depression.
There is a significant difference between assuming that competent adults who
are laypersons do not have the expertise to evaluate the risks of newfound
medical treatments, versus assuming that competent adults cannot consent to
medical treatments proven to be safest for their health because these adults do
not have a sense of their own moral views and therefore of what might be best
for their mental health. Carhart thus allows the government to ban the safest and
most effective procedure rather than trust competent adult women to make their
own decisions about abortion, which could be fully informed in a way that
consent to experimental medications could not. Carhart’s woman-protective
rationale presents a kind of paternalism and a denial of women’s decisionmaking capacity that is not supported by allowing government restrictions on
novel and untested medical drugs and devices.
Second, Carhart’s woman-protective rationale is readily distinguishable not
only because it involves non-experimental treatment, but also because it
imposes known physical health risks in order to prevent purely speculative
356. See Jacobson & Parmet, supra note 355, at 206–07. See also Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail
Alliance: The Reality Behind the Right to Get Experimental Drugs, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045, 1066 (2008)
(stating that “the attempt by the plaintiffs to get early access to such drugs poses a very real conflict
between the interests of dying patients desperate to get a chance at any possible treatment, even
those that are largely a shot in the dark, and society as a whole, which will benefit from the
knowledge learned in clinical trials”); Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental Drug Approval, and
the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 315 (2000) (“People
confronting the prospect of imminent death face very limited risks from experimental medication,
and even a small incremental probability for improvement may constitute an enormous benefit to
them. The disjunction between the interests of the desperately ill and that of consumer protection for
the broader public has long been recognized.”)
357. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–63 (2007) (noting that trial courts had found that
intact D&E could be safest procedure in some instances).
358. Carhart did express concern that physicians would not disclose details of the procedure to
their patients. However, if that was truly the concern it could have been resolved by simply
requiring physicians to inform patients of all relevant information pursuant to the doctrine of
informed consent. Whether physicians should be obligated to disclose detailed information of
second trimester abortion procedures is discussed supra Part III.C.
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psychological harm. The FDA regulates new drugs to prevent serious physical
harm to patients by ensuring that medical treatments are both effective and
safe.359 Carhart oddly suggests that an abortion procedure should be banned
despite the fact that it is the most effective and safe procedure,360 because of the
unsubstantiated risk that patients may suffer “regret.” Many decisions related
to medical care besides abortion may lead to patient regret, yet the State
generally does not bar access to those medical treatments.361 Mental health is
certainly a valid public health issue, and I do not wish to imply that protection
from physical harm should be privileged over protection from mental harm as a
general matter.362 However, it seems more troublingly paternalistic for the State
to substitute its judgment as to a mentally competent adult’s capacity to judge
the risk of regret, as opposed to protecting individuals from risks of grave
physical harm from untested treatments, particularly where the threat of
psychological harm remains unsupported by available evidence.363 Furthermore,
from an equality perspective it is certainly troubling that government secondguesses only women’s medical decision-making on the ground of “protecting”
them from an uncorroborated risk of emotional injury, especially where the
government imposes proven risks of physical injury in the process.
Notably, once medications have passed the FDA’s approval process, the
federal courts have been less willing to allow the FDA to impose further
restrictions.364 For example, in Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 365 the
Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a federal law restricting the
ability of drug sellers to advertise and promote compounded drugs, which are
moderately altered forms of approved medications.366 Interestingly, Thompson
359. Alice K. Marcee, Expanded Access to Phase II Clinical Trials in Oncology: A Step Toward
Increasing Scientific Validity and Compassion, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 439 (2008); Judy Vale, Note,
Expanding Expanded Access: How The Food And Drug Administration Can Achieve Better Access To
Experimental Drugs For Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143 (2008); Austin Winniford, Note,
Expanding Access To Investigational Drugs For Treatment Use: A Policy Analysis And Legislative Proposal,
19 HEALTH MATRIX 205 (2009); Allison J. Goodman, Comment, Abigail Alliance v. von Eschenbach:
Restricting Access to Potentially Lifesaving Drugs Since 2007, 25 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 107
(2008).
360. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 162–63 (2007).
361. See supra Part III.C.
362. I thank Lisa Ikemoto for raising this point.
363. See Jerry Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 44–45 (2007) (discussing
when and whether government paternalism is justified and noting the strong tradition of autonomy
particularly as against government paternalism).
364. See, e.g., Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 524 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding that FDA must
reconsider denial of Plan B emergency contraception over-the-counter to girls under age of
seventeen and grant such access to seventeen year olds since FDA decisions were made through
improper political influence).
365. 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
366. Drug compounding is a practice in which a doctor or pharmacist combines or alters
ingredients of existing medications to tailor the medication to an individual patient’s particular
medical needs. Id. at 360–61. Compounding “is a traditional component of the practice of
pharmacy.” Id. at 361. Drug compounding is used when the needed medication is not commercially
available, such as for a patient who is allergic to an ingredient in a mass-produced product. The FDA
gave pharmacists more leeway for drug compounding since it did not “make sense to require
compound drugs created to meet the unique needs of individual patients to undergo the testing
required for the new drug approval process,” because pharmacists “do not make enough money
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emphasized that speech restrictions could not be justified based on a “highly
paternalistic approach” that assumes patients lack the judgment to make
decisions about their own healthcare.367
The federal government asserted its substantial interest in preserving
public health as a justification for limiting advertising of compounded drugs.368
The government argued that its advertising restrictions achieved the proper
balance between the compelling but competing interests of controlling the “new
drug” approval process while also preserving the availability of compounded
drugs for individual patients who have particularized medical needs and could
not otherwise use commercially mass marketed products approved by the
FDA.369 The Court rejected the argument that the government’s advertising
restrictions could be justified on the ground that direct-to-consumer advertising
would put patients at risk by causing them to seek compounded drugs even
when not medically necessary.370 Stating that “this concern amounts to a fear
that people would make bad decisions if given truthful information about
compounded drugs,”371 the Court also rejected the dissent’s suggestion that
advertising of compounded drugs will be confusing to patients. The Court noted
from small-scale compounding to make safety and efficacy testing of their compounded drugs
economically feasible.” Id. at 369–70. In essence, requiring such testing would force pharmacists to
stop providing compounded drugs and would deny patient need. Although Congress had left
regulation of compounding to the states for fifty years after the enactment of the FDCA, the FDA
eventually became concerned that some pharmacists were manufacturing and selling “new” drugs
in the guise of compounding and thereby avoiding the FDCA’s mandates. Id. at 362. The FDA
promulgated guidelines restricting the ability of retail pharmacists to manufacture and sell
compound drugs, which eventually were in large part adopted by Congress when it enacted the
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA). Id. at 33–64. A group of
pharmacies specializing in drug compounding brought a challenge to a section of the FDAMA that
required that prescriptions for compounded drugs be “unsolicited” and that prohibited the
advertising or promotion of “the compounding of any particular drug, class of drug, or type of
drug.” Id. at 365. The pharmacists asserted that these restrictions violated the First Amendment,
because these were an unwarranted restriction on truthful and non-misleading commercial speech.
Id. at 366. The Ninth Circuit had found that the restrictions did in fact violate the First Amendment.
Id. at 360.
367. Id. at 375 (quoting Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 48, 77 (1976)).
368. The Court applied the First Amendment test for commercial speech, which included
reviewing the government’s substantial interest in the restriction on commercial speech. Id. at 366.
369. Id. at 368.
370. Id. at 374.
371. Id. The Court emphasized that it had “previously rejected the notion that the Government
has an interest in preventing the dissemination of truthful commercial information in order to
prevent members of the public from making bad decisions with the information.” Id. The Court
quoted from Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769, which rejected the government’s argument
defending restrictions on pharmacists’ advertising of pricing on the ground that if individuals
received pricing information they would choose low quality pharmacy to save on cost. Thompson,
535 U.S. at 374–75. The Court stated that government should “assume that this information is not in
itself harmful, that people will perceive their own best interests if only they are well enough
informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them.” Id. (quoting Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy 425 U.S. at 770). The Court made this
proclamation despite considerable evidence, cited by the dissent, that consumer advertising does
create significant effects on consumer demand and physicians’ willingness to prescribe. Id. at 383
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing evidence of effects of consumer-directed advertising on specific
medications).
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that any such confusion could be addressed by “requiring each compounded
drug to be labeled with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing
and that its risks were unknown.”372 In other words, where information is
available, the solution must be to provide the patient with more information, not
less.
Regardless of whether one ultimately agrees with the courts’ decisions on
this issue, government regulation of experimental drugs does not provide
support for Carhart’s public health styled, woman-protective rationale for
criminalizing access to the safest methods of abortion. The courts justify bans on
access to novel medical treatments on the grounds of protecting patients from
physical harm due to a lack of information on safety and efficacy, yet those
rationales do not apply to bans on proven methods of abortion.
2. Physician Assisted Suicide
The Supreme Court’s precedents on end of life decision-making are also
pertinent to the question of the law’s treatment of patient capacity to make
important medical decisions. The Court has expressed the view that, while the
Constitution protects patients’ right to refuse even life-saving medical treatment,
the Constitution does not protect a fundamental right to physician assisted
suicide. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court unanimously rejected the
argument that competent adult terminally ill patients have a substantive due
process right to physician assisted suicide (PAS). 373 Justice Kennedy relied
heavily on Glucksberg to support his reasoning in Carhart.374
This section argues that the Court’s rationales for allowing states to prevent
patients from choosing assisted suicide do not provide support for Carhart’s
dismissal of the decision-making capacity of female patients seeking abortion.
Glucksberg presents the hardest of the Court’s medical decision-making
precedents to distinguish, since its reasoning is arguably as thoroughly
paternalistic as Carhart’s in its assessment of the quality of patient decisionmaking.375 However, Glucksberg’s rationales meaningfully differ from Carhart’s
woman-protective reasoning in at least three ways. First, bans on PAS serve to
protect patients who are not mentally competent or not making voluntary
decisions, unlike bans on intact D&E. Second, bans on PAS protect patients from
the gravest of physical harms, as opposed to the purely speculative risk of
psychological harm that purportedly concerned the Carhart Court. Third, bans
on PAS apply to all terminally ill persons regardless of gender, whereas
Carhart’s gender-specific reasoning raises special equal protection concerns.
The Court first addressed end-of-life decision-making in Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health. 376 In Cruzan, the Court “assume[d] that the United
States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected
372. Id. at 376.
373. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
374. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007).
375. See Capron, supra note 106, at 398–99 (noting the “state’s primary interests here have been
found to be a paternalistic concern to safeguard the individual from his own unwise decision, a
ritualistic desire to uphold ‘the sanctity of life,’ and a collective interest in preserving each person’s
productivity for society’s benefit.”).
376. 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
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right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,” but did not decide the issue
in that case as the patient, Nancy Cruzan, was incompetent.377 Cruzan relied
heavily on informed consent law in interpreting the Due Process Clause as a
source of protection for patient autonomy. As the Court noted later, Cruzan
premised its assumption that the Constitution protects a right to refuse
lifesaving treatment upon “the common-law rule that forced medication was a
battery[] and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted
medical treatment” under the law of informed consent.378 Chief Justice
Rehnquist observed that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”379 Cruzan
emphasized that informed consent doctrine “has become firmly entrenched in
American tort law” and that it embodies this “notion of bodily integrity.”380 The
Court stressed that “even the touching of one person by another without
consent and without legal justification was a battery.”381 It reasoned that “[t]he
logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally
possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”382 The Court also
reviewed case law previously addressing the topic, noting that courts had found
that the right to refuse medical treatment could be protected both by the
common law doctrine of informed consent and by a constitutional right of
privacy.383
Despite recognizing a patient’s right to autonomous decision-making even
with respect to ending the patient’s own life, in Washington v. Glucksberg the
Supreme Court unanimously held that the Constitution does not protect patient
access to PAS.384 In numerous separate opinions, the Justices articulated a
number of different justifications for upholding bans on PAS. In the majority
opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the government had three separate
interests in criminalizing physician assisted suicide. First, the government had
an interest in the preservation of human life, including the terminally ill.385
Notably, in discussing the State’s interest in protecting human life, the Court
emphasized that not all patients seeking PAS are mentally competent and that
377. Id. at 269.
378. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
379. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (quoting Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 270.
383. See id. at 271–77. Justice O’Connor’s concurrence emphasized that the constitution protects a
“liberty interest” in refusing unwanted medical treatment, noting that “the Court has often deemed
state incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.” Id. at
287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). O’Connor also suggested that a state’s refusal to implement the
decisions of a patient’s appointed surrogate could violate a patient’s fundamental right to refuse
treatment. Id. at 292. “The State’s imposition of medical treatment on an unwilling competent adult
necessarily involves some form of restraint and intrusion.” Id. at 288.
384. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). In addition, in Vacco v. Quill, the Court held that there is no violation of
equal protection if the State permits patients to refuse life saving treatment and thereby commit
suicide, but does not permit patients to obtain physician assistance in suicide. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
385. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728–31.
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physicians often have difficulty detecting lack of mental competence,
particularly for patients suffering from depression.386 Thus, “legal physicianassisted suicide could make it more difficult for the State to protect depressed or
mentally ill persons.”387 Second, the Court found that the government had an
interest in “protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”388 The
Court relied in part on the American Medical Association’s code of ethics, which
prohibits PAS, and reasoned that PAS undermines physician-patient trust and
conflicts with the role of the physician as healer.389 Third and finally, the Court
reasoned that the State could reasonably fear that permitting assisted suicide
“will start it down the path to voluntary and perhaps even involuntary
euthanasia.”390 Most relevant here, the Court asserted that the State “has an
interest in protecting vulnerable groups—including the poor, the elderly, and
disabled persons—from abuse, neglect, and mistakes.” 391 The Court stressed the
“real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations.”392 It
worried in particular that poor persons would be pressured to spare their
families the costs of treatment and that disabled and terminally ill persons
would be subject to discrimination.393
In his concurring opinion, Justice Souter further explained the rationale for
permitting the government to ban PAS. He emphasized that the government
could not ban PAS simply because it disagrees with or thinks it knows better
what should be a competent adult patient’s voluntary choice.394 Rather, Justice
Souter stressed that government could justify overriding competent adult
decisions to seek PAS only to protect patients who are not in fact competent or
acting voluntarily:
[The State can justify banning physician assisted suicide] not with a moral
judgment contrary to [the patient’s], but with a recognized state interest in the
protection of nonresponsible individuals.395

Justice Souter particularly expressed concern about mistaken decisions that
result from inadequate palliative care or an erroneous terminal prognosis, and
“coercion and abuse” stemming from large medical bills.396 He recognized that
none of these rationales apply to the patient who is in fact mentally competent,
not subject to mistake, coercion or abuse, and voluntarily decides to obtain
PAS.397 However, he reasoned that the government’s fear of a “slippery slope”
386. Id. at 730–31.
387. Id. at 731.
388. Id.
389. Id. Carhart also relied on the government’s interest in protection of life and preservation of
medical ethics as rationales for upholding the federal “partial-birth” abortion ban. See Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007). A full discussion of these rationales is beyond the scope of this
article.
390. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 732.
391. Id. at 731.
392. Id. at 732.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 782 (Souter, J., concurring).
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Id.
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presented a constitutionally sufficient justification for banning assisted suicide
even to those patients who are competent and acting voluntarily.398 In particular,
“the barrier between assisted suicide and euthanasia could become porous, and
the line between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia as well . . . because there
is a plausible case that the right claimed [for competent, voluntary decisions to
use assisted suicide] would not be readily containable by reference to facts about
the mind that are matters of difficult judgment, or by gatekeepers who are
subject to temptation, noble or not.”399
Similarly, in her concurrence which provided the fifth vote for Justice
Rehnquist’s majority opinion, Justice O’Connor emphasized that the
government’s interest in the protection of patients who are not in fact competent
or making voluntary decisions presented the only constitutionally sufficient
justification for state bans on assisted suicide: “I agree that the State’s interests in
protecting those who are not truly competent or facing imminent death, or those
whose decisions to hasten death would not truly be voluntary, are sufficiently
weighty to justify a prohibition against physician assisted suicide.”400 Justice
Stevens also opined in his concurrence that “[m]uch more than the State’s
paternalistic interest in protecting the individual from the irrevocable
consequences of an ill-advised decision motivated by temporary concerns is at
stake.”401 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment due to what he saw as the
State’s legitimate concerns about being able to regulate PAS such that only
competent, terminally ill patients making voluntary choices would obtain
assisted suicide.402
Glucksberg’s reasoning does not support Carhart’s woman-protective
rationale for restricting access to abortion. Glucksberg’s rationales differ in at
least three ways. First, Glucksberg permitted government bans on PAS primarily
out of concern that the government would not be able to protect dying patients
who were not in fact mentally competent or not acting voluntarily in choosing
PAS. In other words, the Court justified government bans on PAS as the only
means to ensure that mentally incompetent patients or patients subject to
coercion are protected from involuntary death, even if this approach results in
some competent, uncoerced patients being denied autonomy in seeking PAS.403
This “slippery slope” rationale is in line with cases like Jacobson (which
Glucksberg relied upon as support), and its “for the common good” rationale, 404

398. Id. at 785.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also id. at 738 (“The difficulty in defining terminal
illness and the risk that a dying patient’s request for assistance in ending his or her life might not be
truly voluntary justifies the prohibitions on assisted suicide we uphold here.”).
401. Id. at 740–41 (Stevens, J., concurring).
402. See id. at 740. Justice Stevens also argued that the “State’s legitimate interest in preventing
abuse does not apply to an individual who is not victimized by abuse, who is not suffering from
depression, and who makes a rational and voluntary decision to seek assistance in dying,” and that
those patients should be able to seek access to PAS on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 747.
403. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82
MINN. L. REV. 895, 898–901 (1998) (discussing rationales of individual justices for banning PAS).
404. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S 11, 17 (1905). See Also Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious
Views Against Proposed ‘Mercy Killing’ Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1042 (1958) (arguing that the
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in the sense that the Court validated governmental overriding of patient
autonomy only to protect third parties other than the competent patient making
voluntary decisions.405 In contrast, Carhart permits the State to override women’s
decisions about abortion where there are no sound reasons to doubt competence
and voluntariness. Carhart does not suggest that the federal ban serves to protect
women who are in fact mentally incompetent or coerced into their decision.
Rather, Carhart implies that pregnancy alone renders women incompetent. In
other words, a rational pregnant woman would make only one choice—the
government’s choice. Unlike Glucksberg, which recognizes that some patients
seeking PAS may be competent and acting voluntarily, Carhart’s womanprotective reasoning declares all pregnant women incompetent to choose
appropriate medical care related to abortion.406
Second, as with experimental drugs, government bans on PAS represent its
efforts to protect patients from grave physical harm, not a specious risk of
psychological harm. A mistaken terminal prognosis, lack of mental competence,
or coercion in the context of PAS results in the involuntary death of the patient.
Government override of patient autonomy to protect at least some patients from
an unwanted death seems rather compelling. It is a different order of
paternalism when the State claims to protect the public from serious physical
harm—or death—as opposed to the State protecting patients from an unproven
risk of potential emotional consequences resulting from their own allegedly
poor decision-making, especially when this “protection” also endangers the
patient’s physical health. Furthermore, Glucksberg appears to support the
opposite balance in terms of physical versus psychological harm. Glucksberg
privileges avoiding physical harm (unwanted death) over the psychological
harm that may result from prolonged existence against one’s will while
terminally ill,407 whereas Carhart elevates the avoidance of psychological harm
over the avoidance of physical harm.408 If the government regularly imposed
physical health risks to protect patients from regret—as in the case of prostate
cancer treatment—perhaps the woman-protective anti-abortion logic would
seem less discriminatory. However, Carhart’s brand of paternalism—imposing a
ban on the physically safest medical procedure on the ground that someone
other than the patient knows what is best for the patient’s mental health—is
particularly disturbing since it only applies to women patients seeking abortion.
Lastly, Glucksberg does not support this gender-specific paternalism that
animates the woman-protective anti-abortion argument.409 There are no sound
potential abuses of PAS outweigh the benefits of relieving suffering for some patients who would
voluntarily choose PAS).
405. Again, Carhart also claims that intact D&E, like physician assisted suicide, should be banned
because of the State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus, but to argue that pregnancy renders a
competent adult woman incompetent is quite a different and unjustified claim. Gonzales v. Carhart,
550 U.S. 124, 157–58 (2007).
406. See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159–60.
407. Norman L. Cantor, On Kamisar, Killing, and the Future of Physician-Assisted Death, 102 MICH.
L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2004) (stating that “[a]utonomy, constructive preference, and dignity are the
crucial objects” of patients seeking PAS).
408. I thank Susan Frelich Appleton for raising this point.
409. See Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 5, at 1049 (arguing that Carhart’s
paternalism is particularly troubling “because of the mistaken and harmful judgments about women
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reasons (other than the sex-based stereotypes articulated in Carhart) to treat
competent pregnant women as being unable to choose medical treatment for
abortion if given appropriate information.410 Although some of Glucksberg’s
rationales can be fairly characterized as unjustly incapacitating competent adult
patients since ultimately they rest on a felt need to protect patients from their
own poor decisions,411 Glucksberg can still be distinguished from Carhart’s
woman-protective rationale based on differences in the patient population at
issue. There, the Court rested on assumptions about terminally ill patients and
expressed much concern about the decision-making abilities of dying patients
due to the vulnerability and dependency that inevitably results for some
patients from their serious illnesses.412 Even assuming that the rationales in
Glucksberg and Carhart are similarly paternalistic towards the capacity of
patients to make significant medical decisions, the assumptions in Glucksberg
applied equally to all similarly situated patients—to all terminally ill men and
women seeking PAS.413 Therefore, “the rights of a politically vulnerable group
are not at stake. . . . in the same, sure way as are black people subject to race
discrimination laws [or] women subject to abortion restrictions.”414 As Justice
O’Connor noted, “Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or
a family member’s illness.”415 Our equal protection jurisprudence does not offer
heightened scrutiny for stereotyping based on disability, poverty, or age, but
does apply heightened scrutiny to government actions that are gender specific
or motivated by gender stereotypes. Carhart’s woman-protective rationale for

it engenders. Lawmakers reasoning from traditional forms of gender paternalism may not recognize
that women who have abortions are competent decision makers grappling with complex practical
and relational considerations.”).
410. Although the Carhart Court does not explicitly state that physicians are coercing women
into intact D&E procedures, it suggests as much in its characterization of “abortion doctors” who
refuse to disclose information the Court believes would be relevant to the woman’s decision. Yet,
rather than requiring disclosure of the information, the Court concluded that women are incapable
of determining where their own health interests lie. See supra Part III.C.
411. The “coercion” rationale is arguably most paternalistic.
See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1501, 1510–11 (2008).
412. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 730–31 (1997).
413. Of course, PAS does have gendered implications in terms of its potential implementation.
See Susan M. Wolf, Gender, Feminism, and Death: Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in FEMINISM
& BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 282–308 (Wolf ed., 1996).
414. Yale Kamisar, On the Meaning and Impact of the Physician-Assisted Suicide Cases, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 895, (1998) (stating that “[d]ying people are clearly not a discrete and insular minority” and
therefore the democratic political processes can be fairly relied upon) (internal quotations omitted).
See also Yale Kamisar, Foreword: Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and
Personal Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (2008) (distinguishing Lawrence v. Texas on the
ground that “Glucksberg did not demean any politically vulnerable group”); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S.
793 (1997) (rejecting argument that bans on PAS violate the Equal Protection Clause because of
differential treatment of patients who can choose suicide by removing life support).
415. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 737 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“There is no reason to think the
democratic process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of terminally ill, mentally
competent individuals who seek to end their suffering and the State’s interests in protecting those
who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.”)
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forcing women to use a less safe method of abortion rests on gender stereotypes
that have long been repudiated under the Equal Protection Clause. 416
IV. CONCLUSION
Some scholars have argued that Carhart has had little practical effect on
abortion rights.417 To the contrary, not only does the decision detrimentally
impact women’s health in clinical practice,418 Carhart’s woman-protective
reasoning has had and will continue to have significant impact both legally and
politically, and both within abortion law and beyond abortion law. Within
abortion law, Carhart’s woman-protective rationale has already had significant
impact in the courts and in the public arena, as exhibited particularly by
legislatures enacting even more biased abortion “informed consent” laws, such
as the legislation recently upheld in South Dakota.419 Beyond abortion law,
Carhart’s incapacitation of women as healthcare decision-makers could have a
significant impact on how courts and legislatures view women, particularly
pregnant women, as patients. The woman-protective anti-abortion claim not
only reinforces the familiar notion that women are irrational decision-makers,
but also the notion that women serve their ultimate role in society when they are
mothers and that, as mothers, their only choice is to be self-sacrificing. When the
Supreme Court places its imprimatur on these kinds of arguments about
women’s decision-making capacity, or lack thereof, lower courts and
legislatures may well feel more free to follow it.
It would not be surprising to see Carhart’s logic extended to other
healthcare issues generally involving “maternal-fetal conflict.”420 If women are
416. See Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion, supra note 5, at 991 (arguing that “woman-protective”
anti-abortion reasoning provides grounds for challenging abortion restrictions as violations of Equal
Protection).
417. See, e.g., David J. Garrow, Significant Risks: Gonzales v. Carhart and the Future of Abortion
Law, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2007).
418. See Tracy A. Weitz & Susan Yanow, Implications of the Federal Abortion Ban for Women’s Health
in the United States,16 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 99, 103–04 (2008) (discussing clinical
implications of “partial-birth” abortion bans, including physicians feeling pressured to deviate from
safest medical procedures to avoid criminal liability and physicians refusing to perform second
trimester abortions entirely due to fear of prosecution).
419. See, e.g., Gold & Nash, supra note 222, at 6 (“Kennedy’s implication that the pre-abortion
counseling process could and perhaps should be used as a forum for dissuading a woman from
having the procedure is widely viewed as an invitation to states to take a new look at their abortionspecific ‘informed consent’ policies.”). See also Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724,
726 (8th Cir. 2008) (relying on Carhart’s “regret” rationale to uphold South Dakota’s “informed
consent” legislation requiring physicians to inform abortion patients that abortion will terminate the
life of a “whole, separate, unique living human being”).
420. There is an extensive literature discussing the issue of “maternal-fetal conflict.” See, e.g.,
Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s Fiduciary Role in MaternalFetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV., 451, n.4 (2000) (noting the rich literature on “maternal-fetal”
conflicts [hereinafter Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders]); Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Legal and Ethical
Issues (Bibliography), in NATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR BIOETHICS LITERATURE, KENNEDY
INSTITUTE OF ETHICS (1990) (bibliography of literature on this topic); Mary Carrington Coutts,
Maternal-Fetal Conflict: Legal and Ethical Issues, Scope Note 14, in NATIONAL REFERENCE CENTER FOR
BIOETHICS LITERATURE, KENNEDY INSTITUTE OF ETHICS (1990). Almost all of the commentators in this
field have concluded that, except in extreme circumstances, neither physicians nor the State should
interfere with pregnant women’s right to informed consent. See Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’

Manian Macro 2.doc

290 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY

8/3/2009 10:33:37 AM

Volume 16:223 2009

irrational decision-makers better served by the substitute judgment of others,
then why not allow government to trump women’s right to informed consent in
the many other areas in which a pregnant woman’s decisions could arguably
harm her fetus? There are numerous examples of “maternal-fetal conflicts” in
medical practice, in particular conflicts related to pregnant women’s right to
refuse medical treatment.421 The woman-protective argument could be deployed
to justify denying pregnant women’s right to refuse blood transfusions, cesarean
sections, drug treatment, or other invasive medical treatment for the benefit of
the fetus on the ground that women would “regret” decisions to forgo such care.
Courts and legislatures have already justified denying pregnant women’s
autonomy in these contexts at least in part by impugning their ability to make
sound decisions. Those cases that have denied pregnant women’s right to refuse
treatment have tended to rely on gender-stereotyped claims that women are
irrational decision-makers and should be self-sacrificing mothers.422 For
Orders, supra note 420, at 451, 452, n.8 (2000) (noting that the majority of commentators conclude that
“in all but the most extreme circumstances, it is impermissible to infringe upon the pregnant
woman’s autonomy rights”). A few scholars have argued to the contrary. See, e.g., Joel Jay Finer,
Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights, Responsibility, and Decisional Authenticity,
76 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1991); Jeffrey A. Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting
the Potentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97 (1985); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty
and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth 69 VA. L. REV. 405 (1983). Although labeled as
“maternal-fetal conflict,” it is important to note that the “conflict” only arises through the
involvement of the medical profession. Michelle Oberman has argued that these cases should be
termed “maternal-doctor conflicts,” because these conflicts “originate in the context of the
relationship between the doctor and the pregnant woman” and result from the doctor’s “seemingly
well-motivated efforts” to impose his or her perception of appropriate care. Oberman, Mothers and
Doctors’ Orders, supra note 420, at 454. When the patient refuses the physician’s advice, physicians
and hospitals then seek court orders to obtain permission to trump women’s right to refuse
treatment. “Maternal-fetal conflicts” thus involve an effort by both the physician and the State to
override the pregnant patient’s right to informed consent. See id. Notably, many of the cases
involving forced caesarean sections or forced drug treatment involve poor women of color. See Lisa
Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of Motherhood, The Practice of
Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 (1992) (discussing
regulation of pregnant women and noting targeting of poor women of color); DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
421. As discussed in Part III.A, patients’ right to refuse medical treatment, even life-saving
treatment, is a well-established common law and constitutional right. See supra Part III.A. In
numerous instances, courts have denied pregnant women’s right to refuse treatment by ordering
life-saving blood transfusions against women’s wishes, or ordering forced Cesarean sections or drug
treatment. See, e.g., Ikemoto, supra note 420, at 1236–83 (discussing various types of regulation of
pregnant women). Many state legislatures have denied pregnant women’s right to reject life-saving
medical treatment by refusing to recognize their advanced healthcare directives. See Linda C.
Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for
Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537 (2006) (discussing limits on pregnant women’s
advanced healthcare directives).
422. Lisa Ikemoto, Furthering Inquiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of
Pregnant Women, 59 TENN. L. REV. 487, 502 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Furthering Inquiry] (analyzing
forced medical treatment cases and concluding that judges and physicians characterized women
who refused treatment as irrational). Of the many different possible conflicts between a pregnant
patient and her physician, forced caesarean sections have received the most legal attention, from
both scholars and the courts. See Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders, supra note 420, at 478–79
(noting that scholars have been particularly attracted to the “high-drama scenario” of cesarean
section litigation). A number of courts have addressed pregnant women’s right to refuse medical
treatment in this context. See, e.g., In re. A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. Cir.1990); Jefferson v. Griffin
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example, scholars reviewing cases on forced cesarean sections have noted that
pregnant women who refuse treatment “are often characterized as stubborn,
guilty, and irrational, even when the court specifically finds them to be clearly
competent.”423 The case law also suggests that “good” mothers should be “selfsacrificing and nurturing.”424 Carhart’s statement that, if a decision may be
characterized as harmful to her fetus, no amount of information can lead to a
valid consent from a pregnant woman, logically supports the conclusion that the
State should substitute its judgment for pregnant women’s healthcare more
generally.425
Although the Court gave other rationales for its holding, Carhart’s adoption
of the anti-abortion movement’s woman-protective reasoning is particularly
troubling for its archaic and stereotyped caricature of the irrational woman.426
As recent media stories have reported, the legal and political battles over
abortion now rage not over “what goes on inside a woman’s womb . . . [but]
what goes on inside her head.”427 The inconsistency between abortion law’s
approach to women’s capacity for sound healthcare decision-making and the
general law on healthcare decision-making exposes the sex discrimination
inherent in the woman-protective anti-abortion argument. Abortion law’s
disrespect for pregnant women’s decision-making abilities unjustifiably
diverges from both private and public law’s treatment of patient decisionmaking in other healthcare contexts. The law obstructs women patients’ selfdetermination for reasons that have not been tolerated for the male patient
population. Most disturbing, Carhart’s woman-protective rationale sugarcoats
violations of women’s right to equal treatment by cloaking those violations in
the language of informed consent and public health. Yet, despite expressing

Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981). The courts have taken two different
approaches to the question of whether the physician and the State can force a cesarean section upon
a pregnant woman. Some courts set forth a clear rule that upholds the woman’s right to refuse
medical treatment under all but the most exceptional circumstances. See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d
1235 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (recognizing pregnant women as capable of making autonomous decisions and
having equal rights to give informed consent or refusal to medical procedures); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that pregnant women have right to refuse medical
treatment equally deserving of constitutional protection). Other courts set forth a balancing test to
weigh the competing interests of the pregnant woman and the State’s interests, although the
“balancing” tends to lead to forced treatment. See, e.g., Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional
Med. Ctr., 66 Fla. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999) (applying balancing test to conclude that forced
caesarean section did not violate woman’s constitutional rights); Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457
(affirming compelled cesarean section).
423. Ikemoto, Furthering Inquiry, supra note 422, at 502.
424. Id. at 511.
425. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that Carhart raises the specter of increased
government regulation of pregnant women, including “prevent[ing] women from eating certain
foods or from drinking alcohol” and “requiring that women submit to fetal monitoring, ultrasounds,
or Caesarian sections”).
426. This long-held notion of women’s irrationality is particularly associated with the work of
Sigmund Freud. See SIGMUND FREUD, THREE ESSAYS ON THE THEORY OF SEXUALITY 87 (James Strachey
ed. 1962) (discussing “the greater proneness of women to neurosis and especially to hysteria”).
427. Stephanie Simon, New Front in Abortion Battle, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2008, at A16.
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concern for women’s autonomous decision-making and emotional well-being,
abortion law fails to actually address those concerns.428
The woman-protective anti-abortion claim has pernicious and far reaching
implications for gender equity in healthcare. In order to counter the force of this
claim, lawmakers should recognize that the woman-protective argument against
abortion is an anomaly in the law’s approach to patient healthcare decisionmaking and therefore a denial of equal treatment for women.

428. See Tracy A. Weitz, et al., You Say “Regret” and I Say “Relief”: A Need to Break the Polemic
About Abortion, 78 CONTRACEPTION 87, 88 (2008) (criticizing “protective” abortion restrictions and
arguing for renewed focus on informed consent that actually supports women’s autonomous
decision-making regarding abortion and childbirth); Reva Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1796 (2008) (arguing that “[b]lanket
restrictions on abortion are not designed to address these concerns” about mental health or coercion
in abortion decision-making, and that rather than deny women agency, law and policy should focus
on measures such as resources to support childrearing, address work-family conflicts, and provide
improved resources for counseling).

